Thursday, December 8, 2016

Hindu Couple can remarry 90 days after divorce

The decision of the HC comes as a relief to estranged Hindu couples who want challenge the orders, decrees or verdicts of the Family Courts.
The ruling came from a full bench presided over by Justice Naresh Patil, Justice Ramesh Dhanuka and Justice Sadhana Jadhav. In 2014, another division bench headed by Justice Abhay Oka had referred the matter to a full bench, wherein the full bench was requested to deal with the legal controversy of appeal period for Hindu couples.
The basic controversy was that whether the provisions of Family Courts Act which provides for a 30 days deadline will be applicable for divorcing Hindu couples or the provisions mentioned in the Hindu Marriage Act, which provides for a total of 90 days deadline to file appeals.
The significance of the limitation provided by law is that once the appeal deadline ends, the divorced couple is free to remarry without the fear of challenge to the family court decree.
In its 30-page order, the full bench said, “While interpreting the provisions of the said two enactments (Family Courts Act and Hindu Marriage Act), it needs to be considered that we are a country of vast population, millions of people face financial hardship for litigating a matter, people have to spend considerable amount of time, money and energy. The geographical conditions further make easy access to justice difficult.”
“We are of the view that considering the scheme of both the enactments it would not be appropriate to apply different period of limitation, one in case of orders passed by the Family Courts and in another by the regular Civil Courts. Such an approach would frustrate very purpose of legislation,” the bench added.
Accordingly, the bench held that if an appeal is filed by any Hindu individual under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, the period of limitation prescribed under the Hindu Marriage Act (90 days) would apply.
The decision of the HC comes as a relief to estranged Hindu couples who want challenge the orders, decrees or verdicts of the Family Courts.
The controversy was that whether the provisions of Family Courts Act which provides for a 30 days deadline will be applicable for divorcing Hindu couples or the provisions mentioned in the Hindu Marriage Act, which provides for a total of 90 days deadline to file appeals.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO. 161 OF 2013
Shri Shivram Dodanna Shetty
Aged 54 years, Occupation : Service,
Residing at Building No. 40, Sumrite
Co-Op. Society, Room No. 2, Sector-7,
New Panvel, Dist. Raigad. .. Appellant
Versus
Sou. Sharmila Shivram Shetty
Aged 31 years, Occupation : Service,
Residing at 2, Ekveera Dharshan
Building, Kisan Nagar No.1,
Thane – 400 604. .. Respondent
Ms. Zenobia S. Irani/Nair a/w Mr. Prashant Tikare a/w Fatima
Rampurwalla for appellant.
Mr. Nitin P. Dalvi for respondent.
Mr. Aspi Chinoy, Senior Counsel, Amicus Curiae.
Mr. Murtaza Najmi, Advocate appeared suo motu.
 CORAM: NARESH H. PATIL,
 R. D. DHANUKA &
 SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV, JJ.
 RESERVED ON : AUGUST 26, 2016.
 PRONOUNCED ON : DECEMBER 01, 2016

JUDGMENT [ Per Naresh H. Patil, J.] :
1. A question framed by the Division Bench of this court was
referred to a Larger Bench by the then Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice of
this Court. The question was framed by the Division Bench (Coram:A. S.
Oka & A. S. Gadkari, JJ.) by an order dated 10/12/2014. The said question
reads as under :-
“Whether an appeal under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the
Family Courts Act, 1984 will be governed by the period of
limitation under sub-section (3) of section 19 or whether the
period of limitation provided under sub-section (4) of section
28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 will apply to such
Appeal?
2. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short “the Act of 1955)
was enacted by Parliament for amending and codifying the law relating to
marriage amongst Hindus. The Act of 1955 became law on 18/5/1955.
The Act of 1955 was amended by Amendment Act 68 of 1976, Amendment
Act 2 of 1978 and Amendment Act 50 of 2003. The proceedings under
the Act of 1955 were to be instituted in District Court. Section 3(b) defines
“District Court” as under:-
“(3) Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires, -
(a)
(b) “district Court” means, in any area for which there is a
City Civil Court, that Court, and in any other area the principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction, and includes any other
Civil Court which may be specified by the State Government,
by notification in the Official Gazette, as having jurisdiction in
respect of the matters dealt with in this Act;”
The provision for filing of appeals from decrees and orders is prescribed
under Section 28 of the Act of 1955, which reads as under :-
“28. Appeals from decrees and orders.-(1) All decrees made
by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall, subject to
the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable as decrees of
the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction,
and every such appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals
ordinarily lie from the decisions of the Court given in the
exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
(2) Orders made by the Court in any proceeding under this
Act under section 25 or section 26 shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable if they are not
interim orders, and every such appeal shall lie to the Court to
which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the Court
given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
(3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the
subject of costs only.
(4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within
a period of ninety days from the date of the decree or order.”
In Section 28(4), the Act prescribed a period of limitation of
thirty days, which came to be substituted to ninety days by way of Act 50
of 2003.
3. The Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short “the Act of 1984) was
enacted to provide establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote
conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to
marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith. The Act
of 1984 was enacted on 14/9/1984. The said Act provides that the State
Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, establish the
Family Court. Section 3 of the Act of 1984 reads as under :-
“3. Establishment of Family Courts.- (1) For the purpose
of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a
Family Court by this Act, the State Government, after
consultation with the High Court, and by notification, -
(a) shall, as soon as may be after the commencement
of this Act, establish for every area in the State
comprising a city or town whose population exceeds
one million, a Family Court;
(b) may establish Family Courts for such other areas
in the State as it may deem necessary.
(2) The State Government shall, after consultation with the
High Court, specify, by notification, the local limits of the area
to which the jurisdiction of a Family Court shall extend and
may, at any time, increase reduce or alter such limits.
Section 7 of the Act of 1984 prescribed as under:
“7. Jurisdiction. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this
Act, a Family Court shall -
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable
by any district Court or any subordinate civil Court
under any law for the time being in force in respect of
suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the
Explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such
jurisdiction under such law, to be a district Court or, as
the case may be, such subordinate civil Court for the
area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court
extends.
Explanation. - The suits and proceedings referred to in this
sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature,
namely:-
(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a
marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring
the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be,
annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights
or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the
validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of
any person;
(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a
marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of
either of them;
(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in
circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;
(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the
legitimacy of any person;
(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;
(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship
of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family
Court shall also have and exercise -
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the
first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for
maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it
by any other enactment.
Section 8 of the Act of 1984 reads as under :-
“8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings. -
Where a Family Court has been established for any area, -
(a) no district Court or any subordinate civil Court
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 shall, in
relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in
respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred
to in the Explanation to that sub-section;
 (b) no Magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have
or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);
(c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to
in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 7 and
every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), -
(i) which is pending immediately before the
establishment of such Family Court before any
district Court or subordinate Court referred to in
that sub-section or, as the case may be, before any
Magistrate under the said Code; and
(ii) which would have been required to be
instituted or taken before or by such Family Court
if, before the date on which such suit or
proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act had
come into force and such Family Court had been
established,
shall stand transferred to such Family Court on
the date on which it is established.
The provision of appeal is prescribed under Section 19, which
reads as under :-
“19. Appeal. - (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal
shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both
on facts and on law.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the
Family Court with the consent of the parties or from an order
passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to
any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed
under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2
of 1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts
(Amendment) Act, 1991.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within
a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order
of a Family Court.
 (4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise,
call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the
Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order
under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2
of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of order, not being an
interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such
proceeding.
(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to
any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family
Court.
(6) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard
by a Bench consisting of two or more judges.”
4. Section 19(3) of the Act of 1984 prescribed a period of thirty
days for filing appeal from every judgment or order not being an
interlocutory order by Family Court to the High Court, both on facts and on
law.
Section 20 of the Act of 1984 reads as under :-
“20. Act to have overriding effect. - The provisions of this
Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the time being in
force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law
other than this Act.”
5. The provisions of Section 28(4) of the Act of 1955 came to be
amended by substituting the period of limitation from thirty days to ninety
days consequent to the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in the case
of Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey1
. The Family Courts were
established at some places in the State of Maharashtra. At places where the
Family Courts could not be established, proceedings are being initiated in
the regular civil courts.
6. An issue was framed by the Division Bench that whether an
appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1984 will be
governed by the period of limitation under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of
the Act of 1984 or under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Act of 1955?
7. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, learned Senior Counsel, assisted the
court as an Amicus Curiae. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel at
length. It was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that if the two
statutes are so construed and understood, there is no conflict between the
1.AIR 2002 SC 591
two laws, both of which are enacted by Parliament. In his submission, no
question arises of invoking non obstante provision under Section 20 of the
Act of 1984. The Act of 1984 and the non obstante provision is not
intended to and cannot have the result of impliedly repealing provisions
made in the substantive law i.e. the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Act of
1984 provides for a special forum / court to decide such matrimonial
disputes and it also provides for special rules or procedure in such cases.
In this context, the non obstante provision prescribed in Section 20 of the
Act of 1984 is required to be construed, according to the learned Senior
Counsel.
On the principle of interpretation of statutes, learned Senior
Counsel submitted that both the statutes are to be construed and read
harmoniously. The Act of 1984 does not expressly repeal Section 28 of the
Act of 1955. When there is no express repeal, courts have not favoured
such repeal by implication. On the other hand, it is indicated by the courts
that if earlier and later statutes can reasonably be construed in such a way
that both can be effective, the same may be done. The legislature, while
enacting a law, is presumed to have complete knowledge of law on the
same subject matter and, therefore, when it does not provide a repealing

provision, it gives out an intention not to repeal the existing legislation.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Act of 1955
is a special law vis-a-vis the Act of 1984, which is a general law, which
provides a forum for the adjudication of matrimonial disputes arising under
all the diverse substantive laws. It was submitted that it is well settled
principle of interpretation of law that general law does not abrogate earlier
special law by mere implication. The Act of 1984 is essentially a
procedural law. It is a settled principle of interpretation of law that the
legislature while enacting a law in the year 2003 was presumed to be
aware of the provisions of the existing legislation, including Section 19(3)
of the Act of 1984. Therefore, it would be contrary to the purpose and
object of the scheme of law to read the amendment of Section 28(4) as
operating only where the proceedings are brought in the ordinary civil
court and as not applying / operating when proceedings under the Act of
1955 are brought in the Family Court. Learned Senior Counsel referred to
the following judgments :-
(a) Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey [AIR 2002 SC
591].
 (b) R. S. Raghunath vs. State of Karnataka and anr. [(1992)
1 SCC 335].
(c) Viswanathan P. K. Vs. Sindhu M. K. [2009 SCC
OnLine Ker 4124].
(d) Sonia Kunwar Singh Bedi vs. Kunwar Singh Bedi [2015
(1) Mh. L. J. 954].
8. Learned counsel Mr. Murtaza Najmi, who appeared suo motu,
submitted that the Act of 1984 is a later law and it has a overriding effect in
respect of the provisions relating to the limitation prescribed for filing an
appeal. Learned counsel submitted that the appeals arising out of the
proceedings initiated in Family Court shall be governed by the provisions
of Section 19(3) of the Act of 1984 and the appeals arising out of the
ordinary civil court under the Act of 1955 shall be governed by the
provisions of Section 28(4) of the Act of 1984. The counsel submitted that
in a way, in respect of provisions of limitation, both the Acts have certain
inconsistencies, but considering the scheme of the provisions of the Act of
1984, Section 19(3) of the said Act will have be to given precedence over
the provisions of Section 28(4) of the Act of 1955. Learned counsel
submitted that the later general law can repeal prior special law.
9. Ms. Zenobia Irani, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that it is a matter of record that the Parliament did not amend the
provisions relating to limitation as prescribed under the Act of 1984. The
Act of 1984 is partly procedural and partly substantial. A discriminatory
type of provisions are prescribed relating to two different forums
considering the subject matter of appeals prescribed. Keeping in view the
purpose of enactment of both the statutes, the provisions of these statutes
will have to be construed. Learned counsel differs in respect of the
interpretation placed by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Aspi Chinoy, as
stated above.
10. Mr. Nitin Dalvi, learned counsel appearing for respondent,
supported the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Aspi
Chinoy. Learned counsel submitted that both the provisions prescribed
under both the Acts must be considered and construed harmoniously and be
held that a period prescribed under the Act of 1955 under Section 28(4)
shall be applicable to the appeals preferred in the High Court arising out of
the judgments and orders passed by the Family Court or the Civil Court.
Learned counsel submitted that with a view to secure speedy settlement of
disputes relating to marriage and family affairs, separate Family Courts
were established pursuant to the Act 66 of 1984. The Act of 1984 is a

procedural law prescribing procedure to be adopted in the Family Courts.
Prior to the enactment of the Act of 1984, all the family matters were
adjudicated under Order XXXIIA of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 before the
concerned District Courts.
11. We have considered the submissions advanced before us,
perused the provisions of the relevant statutes and the judgments cited.
We have also gone through some of the Parliamentary debates in respect of
passing of both the enactments.
12. In the case of Seaford Court Estates, Ltd. vs. Asher2
 Lord
Denning stated as under :-
“........Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must
be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee
the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it
were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from
all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of
mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the
poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of
Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge,
2 1949 (2) All England Report 155
believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he
must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the
draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been
guilty of some or other ambiguity.........”

13. The provisions of Section 28 (4) of the Act of 1955 came to be
amended consequent to the suggestion given by the Apex Court in Savitri
Pandey's case (Supra). In its letter and spirit, the views of the Apex Court
in the case of Savitri Pandey are required to be considered. The Apex
Court observed that period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal under
Section 28(4) was apparently inadequate which facilitates frustration of
the marriages by unscrupulous litigant spouses. It is necessary to refer to
the observations of the Apex Court in para 18 of the said judgment here
itself:-
“18. At this stage we would like to observe that the period of
limitation prescribed for filing the appeal under Section 28(4)
is apparently inadequate which facilitates the frustration of the
marriages by the unscrupulous litigant spouses. In a vast
country like ours, the powers under the Act are generally
exercisable by the District Court and the first appeal has to be
filed in the High Court. The distance, the geographical
conditions, the financial position of the parties and the time
required for filing a regular appeal, if kept in mind, would
certainly show that the period of 30 days prescribed for filing
the appeal is insufficient and inadequate. In the absence of
appeal, the other party can solemnise the marriage and attempt
to frustrate the appeal right of the other side as appears to have
been done in the instant case. We are of the opinion that a
minimum period of 90 days may be prescribed for filing the
appeal against any judgment and decree under the Act and any
marriage solemnised during the aforesaid period be deemed to
be void. Appropriate legislation is required to be made in this
regard. We direct the Registry that the copy of this judgment
may be forwarded to the Ministry of Law & Justice for such
action as it may deem fit to take in this behalf.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Consequent to the observations and suggestions given by the
Apex Court, quoted above, the Parliament amended the provisions of
Section 28(4) of the Act of 1955. Therefore, the purpose and object
behind amending the said Act in the year 2003 is required to be considered.
While amending the provisions, the Parliament was aware of the existence
of the Act of 1984. It is presumed that the Parliament was conscious of
the existence of another statute relating to the subject, prescribing forum
and procedure and period of limitation. Therefore, a harmonious
interpretation which would advance the object and purpose of the
legislation will have to be adopted.
15. As the Act of 1955 was amended by the Parliament in the year
2003, in that sense, the period of limitation of ninety days was prescribed
by a later law which would override the provisions relating to period of
limitation prescribed in the earlier enactment i.e. Act of 1984. The
substantive provision of law was amended at a later stage and the same
shall prevail being later in point of time.
16. Even if both the Acts are considered on certain subjects and
situations to be special and general, even then, as a matter of sound
interpretation and keeping in view the purpose for providing a larger period
of limitation, it must be construed that the appeals arising out of the
judgment and orders passed by the Family Court shall be governed by a
larger period of limitation prescribed under Section 28(4) of the Act of
1955. Any contrary interpretation would frustrate the very object of the
enactment which was made on the suggestion of the Apex Court in the case
of Savitri Pandey.
17. Considering the provisions of the Act of 1984 and the Act of
1955, we do not find that there is an express repeal of the provisions of
Section 28(4).
18. The Apex Court, in para 11, in the case of R. S. Raghunath
vs. State of Karnataka and anr.3
, by referring to earlier judgment in the
case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC
447], observed as under:-
“..... In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram the
scope of non-obstante clause is explained in the following
words: (SCCp.477-78, para 67)
“ A clause beginning with the expression
`notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in
some particular provision in the Act or in some
particular Act or in any law for the time being in force,
or in any contract' is more often than not appended to a
section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting
part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect
over the provision of the Act or the contract mentioned
in the non-obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that
in spite of the provision of the Act or any other Act
mentioned in the non-obstante clause or any contract or
document mentioned the enactment following it will
3 (1992) 1 SCC 335
have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in
the non-obtante clause would not be an impediment for
an operation of the enactment.”
On a conspectus of the above authorities it emerges that the
non-obstante clause is appended to a provision with a view to
give the enacting part of the provision an overriding effect in
case of conflict. But the non-obstante clause need not
necessarily and always be co-extensive with the operative part
so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of an
enactment and if the words of the enactment are clear and are
capable of a clear interpretation on a plain and grammatical
construction of the words the non-obstante clause cannot cut
down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation.
In such cases the non-obstante clause has to be read as
clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have
been incorporated in the enactment by the legislature by way
of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and
scope of the Special Rules.”
In the above case, in para 7, the Apex Court referred to the
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition, page 168). The
principle of law was stated as under :
“ A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special
one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant,
or, in other words, `where there are general words in a later
Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without
extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier
legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special
legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from
merely by force of such general words, without any indication
of a particular intention to do so. In such cases it is presumed
to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases
which have been already otherwise provided for by the special
Act.”
19. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Aspi Chinoy, referred to the
observations made by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in paras 17
and 20 of the judgment in the case of Viswanathan P. K. vs. Sindhu M.
K.4
, which read as under :
“17. In this case, there is no specific non-obstante clause
available in either statute. But both stipulations occupy the
same field. The dictum above can hence be relied on safely.
The learned counsel contend that the purpose and object of
Marriage Laws Amendment Act 2003 must be taken into
consideration and evidently the Marriage Laws Amendment
Act was enacted in the light of the observations in paragraph
19 of Savitri Pandey (supra) which we have already extracted
4 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 4124
above. The purpose of amending Section 28(4) obviously was
the inconvenience and hardship noted by the Supreme Court
in Savitri Pandey (AIR 2002 SC 591). The Supreme Court
observed that to prefer an appeal before the High Court
against an order passed by the District Court, a period of 30
days may not be sufficient and that such a stipulation is
working out injustice as was revealed in the facts of that case.
The purpose of the Marriage Laws Amendment Act, by which
Section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act was amended, was
obviously to give a larger period of limitation for the parties
aggrieved by the orders passed in matrimonial cases under the
Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act. In this
view of the matter, considering the purpose and object of the
Act it is evident that the period of limitation under Section
28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act which amendment was
brought in with effect from 23-12-2003 must be given
prominence and predominance.
20. Fifthly, the learned counsel contends that the principle
of law is well settled that when a later enactment prescribes a
different period of limitation, such later enactment must be
preferred. Of course, the Hindu Marriage Act was enacted in
1955. The Family Courts Act was enacted in 1984. But the
crucial amendment to Section 28 (4) was enacted later in
2003. The parliament must be presumed to have known the
relevant stipulations of general nature in Section 19(3) while
bringing in the amendment to Section 28(4). In support of this
proposition, the learned counsel relies on the following
observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 21 of Sarwan
Singh (AIR 1977 SC 265) (Supra):”
20. We may refer to the observations made by the Division Bench
of this Court in paras 20, 21, 24 and 25 of the judgment in the case of
Sonia Kunwar Singh Bedi vs. Kunwar Singh Bedi5
, which read as
under:-
“20. Thus, later enactment must prevail over the former. The
same test was approved by the Supreme Court in Shri Ram
Narain vs. Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd., 1956 SCR
603 : AIR 1956 SC 614. On the principle that the later
enactment i.e. Marriage Laws Amendment Act, 2003 must
prevail over the earlier enactment i.e. Family Courts Act, the
larger period of limitation prescribed under section 28(4) of
the Hindu Marriage Act must prevail. On the principle of
equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India also an
identical period of limitation must be held to be applicable
against all orders appealable under section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act. Merely because the order is passed by a
District Court, a larger period of limitation i.e. 90 days and
merely because the order is passed by the Family Court, a
lesser period of limitation of 30 days would be unreasonable
5 2015 (1) Mh.L.J. 954
and will not stand the test of equality. The interpretation must
be such that an identical period of limitation would be
available for orders appealable under section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act – whether such order is passed by the District
Court or the Family Court.
21. Thereafter the learned counsel for the applicant also
raised the contention that in view of section 20 of the Family
Courts Act in which there is non-obstante clause, the Family
Court Act would prevail over the Hindu Marriage Act.
The short question that remains to be considered is
whether the non-obstante clauses in section 19 and 20 can
override the applicability of the period of limitation
prescribed for an appeal under section 28. A non-obstante
clause cannot be read mechanically. The totality of the
circumstances have to be taken into account. The precise
intention of the legislature will have to ascertained. Vague and
general non-obstante clauses cannot operate to militate against
specific stipulations made in enactments to meet specific
situations. We have already discussed above why section 28
(4) of Hindu Marriage Act was amended, this circumstance has
to be given due weightage.
24. The first two decisions relied upon by Mr. Jaisinghani
are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The
remaining three decisions which are pressed into service by
Mr. Jaisinghani were rendered by Allahabad High Court,
Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court, whereas the
last two decisions in the case of Milan Tandel and Surekha
Sawant (supra) are by Division Benches of this Court. We
have already observed that the decisions by the Allahabad,
Madras and Karnataka High Courts can at the most only have
persuasive value.
25. We do not find any reason to take a different view from
the one taken by the Division Bench of our Court in Milan
Laxman Tandel's and Surekha Savant's cases. In view thereof,
we reject the preliminary objection and hold that there is no
delay in filing the appeal. In other words, we hold that the
appeal having been filed within 90 days, as contemplated by
section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act, is within limitation.
Hence, there is no merit in this application and the same is
rejected.”
21. Considering the scheme of the enactments of the Act of 1955
and the Act of 1984, more precisely the provisions of limitation and non
obstante provision provided in the Act of 1984, we do not find a clear
inconsistency between the two enactments. It is principle of law that for
giving a overriding effect to a non obstante provision, there should be clear
inconsistency between the two enactments.
22. The principle of law of interpretation further lays down that in
a given case both the enactments could be special statutes dealing with
different situations and there could be non obstante provision in both the
special statutes. In such a situation, the conflict between two enactments
need to be resolved, considering the purpose and object of the Act.
23. It is settled rule of interpretation that if one construction leads
to a conflict, whereas on another construction, two Acts can be
harmoniously constructed, then the later must be adopted. On such
interpretation, the objects of both the enactments would be fulfilled and
there would be no conflict.
24. While interpreting the provisions of the said two enactments, it
needs to be considered that we are a country of vast population, millions of
people face financial hardship for litigating a matter, people have to spend
considerable amount of time, money and energy. The geographical
conditions further make easy access to justice difficult and taking into
consideration all these circumstances, coupled with the peculiar situation
faced by the parties while litigating matrimonial, family related issues, the
Apex Court made certain observations in the case of Savitri Pandey which
28
full bench matter - fca-161-13
suggestion was accepted by the Parliament and accordingly the law was
amended.
25. We are convinced of the interpretation put up by the learned
Senior Counsel that if the two statutes are construed and understood in its
proper sense, then there is no conflict between the two laws and, therefore,
no question arises of invoking non obstante provision in Section 20 of the
Act of 1984. The enactment of the Act of 1984 or non obstante provision
in Section 20 is not intended to impliedly repeal provisions made in the
Act of 1955. The Act of 1984 provides for a special forum relating to
matrimonial disputes and with that view, special procedure was devised for
expeditious adjudication of the cases. It is in that context the non obstante
provision of Section 20 is required to be construed.
26. A non obstante clause must be given effect to the extent
Parliament intended and not beyond the same. It may be used as a
legislative device to modify the scope of provision or law mentioned in
the said clause. The non obstante clause would throw some light as to the
scope and ambit of the enacting part in case of its ambiguity. But if the
enacting part is clear, its scope cannot be cut down or enlarge by resorting
to non obstante clause.
27. In our view, considering the scheme of the Act of 1984 and the
object and purpose for its enactment, largely the Act is procedural in
nature. The Act of 1984 provides for special forum to decide matrimonial
related disputes and prescribes for special rules and procedure. In this
context, the non obstante provision in Section 20 is required to be
construed.
28. We are of the view that considering the scheme of both the
enactments and the purpose behind amending the provisions of Section 28
(4) of the Act of 1955, it would not be appropriate to apply different period
of limitation, one in case of orders passed by the Family Courts and in
another by the regular Civil Courts. Such an approach would frustrate
very purpose of legislation.
29. For the reasons stated above, we hold that for an appeal filed
under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, period
of limitation prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 shall apply.
30. Reference is answered accordingly.
31. We record our appreciation for valuable assistance rendered to
us by the Amicus Curiae, learned Senior Counsel Shri Aspi Chinoy.
We also appreciate the assistance rendered to us by learned counsel
Shri Murtaza Najmi.
32. We direct the Registry to place the matter before the
appropriate court.
(NARESH H. PATIL,J.)
(R. D. DHANUKA, J.)
(SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV,J.)



Triple talaq unconstitutional, it violates rights of Muslim women in India

The Petitioners claim to have married as per muslim custom under personal law. First petitioner, i.e. the lady is aged about 23 years, whereas, second petitioner is aged about 53 years; both are illiterate. The document in support of their age is the Aadhar card. Both the petitioners are present in the Court, and have been identified by their counsel. In para-11 of the petition, it is averred that the second petitioner has contracted the present marriage after effecting instant talak (Triple Talaq) to his wife. The second petitioner admits before the Court that from his first marriage, he has two minor children, one residing with the wife and other with him. On a specific query as to when and why the instant divorce was effected, the second petitioner would state that to contract second marriage he has divorced his wife, no other reason is pleaded or stated before the Court.

 The question which disturbs the Court is should muslim wives suffer this tyranny for all times? Should their personal law remain so cruel towards these unfortunate wives? Whether the personal law can be amended suitably to alleviate their sufferings? The judicial conscience is disturbed at this monstrosity. The first wife has to live life for no fault of her but for the reason that her husband got attracted to a lady half of her age which is the reason for being divorced. The view that the Muslim husband enjoys an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict instant divorce does not accord with Islamic injunctions. It is a popular fallacy that a Muslim male enjoys, under the Quaranic Law, unbridled authority to liquidate the marriage. The whole Quoran expressly forbids a man to seek pretexts for divorcing his wife, so long as she remains faithful and obedient to him. The Islamic law gives to the man primarily the faculty of dissolving the marriage, if the wife, by her indocility or her bad character, renders the married life unhappy; but in the absence of serious reasons, no man can justify a divorce, either in the eye of religion or the law. If he abandons his wife or puts her away in simple caprice, he draws upon himself the divine anger, for the curse of God, said the Prophet, rests on him who repudiates his wife capriciously. In other Islamic State, where the husband must satisfy the court about the reasons for divorce.

However, Muslim law, as applied in India, has taken a course contrary to the spirit of what the Prophet or the Holy Quoran laid down and the same misconception vitiates the law dealing with the wife's right to divorce. The divorce is permissible in Islam only in cases of extreme emergency. When all efforts for effecting a reconciliation have failed, the parties may proceed to a dissolution of the marriage by 'Talaq' or by 'Khola'. The statement that "the whimsical and capricious divorce by the husband is good in law, though bad in theology" cannot be approved as the correct law. The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters- one from the wife's family and the other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected. (Ref: Pathayi v. Moideen 1968 KLT 763; A. Yousuf Rawther Vs. Sowramma, AIR 1971 Kerala 261; referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in Shamim Ara vs State Of U.P. & another : 2002 (7) SCC 518). The decision in Shamim Ara was rendered in 2002, wherein, the observation of the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court was noticed and approved, which was rendered 20-30 years before.

Country has in recent times marched steps ahead in all walks of life including progressive interpretation of laws which cannot be lost sight of except by compromising with regressive trends.... "Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful." (Refer-- Bai Tahira Vs. Ali Hussain AIR 1979 SC 362).

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Read the Hon"ble Allahabad High Court Judgments:



HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

Court No. - 58

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 51421 of 2016

Petitioner :- Smt. Hina And Another
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sunil Kumar Dwivedi
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.

Hon'ble Suneet Kumar,J.
Petitioners claim to have married as per muslim custom under personal law. First petitioner, i.e. the lady is aged about 23 years, whereas, second petitioner is aged about 53 years; both are illiterate. The document in support of their age is the Aadhar card. Both the petitioners are present in the Court, and have been identified by their counsel. In para-11 of the petition, it is averred that the second petitioner has contracted the present marriage after effecting instant talak (Triple Talaq) to his wife. The second petitioner admits before the Court that from his first marriage, he has two minor children, one residing with the wife and other with him. On a specific query as to when and why the instant divorce was effected, the second petitioner would state that to contract second marriage he has divorced his wife, no other reason is pleaded or stated before the Court.

The petitioners seek a direction to restrain the respondent police authorities and the third respondent, who is the mother of the lady from harassing them, further, to ensure security and safety of the petitioners and in particular to the first petitioner. It is alleged that the respondents are harassing the petitioners living as man and woman.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioners are adult and are at liberty to choose their own partner on attaining age of majority within social framework of the society and the country, therefore, the petitioners cannot be deprived of their life and personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution.
There can be no dispute to the proposition that is being advanced by learned counsel, nor difference in age is an issue, what is disturbing is that the instrument of instant divorce (Triple Talaq), in the facts of the present case, has been used for ulterior purpose for divorcing the wife. It is not being disputed that the first petitioner used to visit Mohalla, Tehsil Rokan Sarai, District Bulandshahar, where she met the second petitioner and fell in love, thereafter, decided to marry. First petitioner left her family and joined the company of second petitioner, consequently, the second petitioner decided to get rid of his first wife by divorcing her by pronouncing instant talaq.

The question which disturbs the Court is should muslim wives suffer this tyranny for all times? Should their personal law remain so cruel towards these unfortunate wives? Whether the personal law can be amended suitably to alleviate their sufferings? The judicial conscience is disturbed at this monstrosity. The first wife has to live life for no fault of her but for the reason that her husband got attracted to a lady half of her age which is the reason for being divorced. The view that the Muslim husband enjoys an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict instant divorce does not accord with Islamic injunctions. It is a popular fallacy that a Muslim male enjoys, under the Quaranic Law, unbridled authority to liquidate the marriage. The whole Quoran expressly forbids a man to seek pretexts for divorcing his wife, so long as she remains faithful and obedient to him. The Islamic law gives to the man primarily the faculty of dissolving the marriage, if the wife, by her indocility or her bad character, renders the married life unhappy; but in the absence of serious reasons, no man can justify a divorce, either in the eye of religion or the law. If he abandons his wife or puts her away in simple caprice, he draws upon himself the divine anger, for the curse of God, said the Prophet, rests on him who repudiates his wife capriciously. In other Islamic State, where the husband must satisfy the court about the reasons for divorce.

However, Muslim law, as applied in India, has taken a course contrary to the spirit of what the Prophet or the Holy Quoran laid down and the same misconception vitiates the law dealing with the wife's right to divorce. The divorce is permissible in Islam only in cases of extreme emergency. When all efforts for effecting a reconciliation have failed, the parties may proceed to a dissolution of the marriage by 'Talaq' or by 'Khola'. The statement that "the whimsical and capricious divorce by the husband is good in law, though bad in theology" cannot be approved as the correct law. The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters- one from the wife's family and the other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected. (Ref: Pathayi v. Moideen 1968 KLT 763; A. Yousuf Rawther Vs. Sowramma, AIR 1971 Kerala 261; referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in Shamim Ara vs State Of U.P. & another : 2002 (7) SCC 518). The decision in Shamim Ara was rendered in 2002, wherein, the observation of the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court was noticed and approved, which was rendered 20-30 years before.

Country has in recent times marched steps ahead in all walks of life including progressive interpretation of laws which cannot be lost sight of except by compromising with regressive trends.... "Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful." (Refer-- Bai Tahira Vs. Ali Hussain AIR 1979 SC 362).

The purpose of Law in a modern secular State based upon the Constitution is to bring about social change. The muslim community comprise a large percentage of Indian population, therefore, a large section of citizen, in particularly women, cannot be left to themselves to be governed by archaic customs and social practise under the garb of personal law purportedly having divine sanction. The women of the community continue to suffer bias, deprived of the protection, they should otherwise get through provisions in the Constitution that provide for equality and non discrimination.

India is a nation in the making, geographical boundaries alone do not define a nation. It is to be adjudged, amongst others, on the parameter of overall human development and how the society in particular treat their women; leaving such a large population to the whims & fancy of personal law which perpetuate gender inequality and is regressive, is not in the interest of society and the country. It impedes and drags India from becoming a nation. The instant divorce (Triple Talaq) though has been deprecated and not followed by all sects of muslim community in the country, however, is a cruel and the most demeaning form of divorce practised by the muslim community at large. Women cannot remain at the mercy of the patriarchal setup held under the clutches of sundry clerics having their own interpretation of the holy Quoran. Personal laws, of any community, cannot claim supremacy over the rights granted to the individuals by the Constitution.
I would not like to say anything further for the reason that the Supreme Court is seized with the matter.
In Shamim Ara, a statement merely made in the pleadings "written statement" though unsubstantiated that the wife was divorced upon delivering copy of the written statement, was not accepted by the Supreme Court and the subsequent marriage contracted by the husband was held void.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petition stands dismissed. The legality of the marriage/divorce and rights of parties is kept open.
No cost.
Order Date :- 5.11.2016
Mukesh Kr.

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Forcing Husband to Get Separated From His Parents, Amounts To Cruelty and divorce granted

                                                                
 .   The question that requires to be answered first is as to  whether  the
averments, accusations and  character  assassination  of  the  wife  by  the
appellant husband in the written statement constitutes  mental  cruelty  for
sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of  the  Act.  The
position of law in this regard has come to  be  well  settled  and  declared
that  levelling  disgusting   accusations   of   unchastity   and   indecent
familiarity with a person outside wedlock and  allegations  of  extramarital
relationship is a  grave  assault  on  the  character,  honour,  reputation,
status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions of  perfidiousness
attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of  an  educated  Indian  wife
and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount to worst form  of
insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to  substantiate  cruelty  in  law,
warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such  allegations  made
in the written statement or suggested in the course of  examination  and  by
way of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has also come to  be
firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the  relevant  portions  of
such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken to  the  findings
recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court. We  find  that  they
are of such quality, magnitude and consequence  as  to  cause  mental  pain,
agony and suffering amounting to the  reformulated  concept  of  cruelty  in
matrimonial law causing profound and  lasting  disruption  and  driving  the
wife to  feel  deeply  hurt  and  reasonably  apprehend  that  it  would  be
dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting her like that  and
rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible.”


  Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, we are inclined  to
hold that the unsubstantiated allegations levelled by  the  Respondent  wife
and the threats and attempt to commit suicide  by  her  amounted  to  mental
cruelty and therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved by a decree  of
divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.

 Taking an overall  view  of  the  entire  evidence  and  the  judgment
delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there was  no  need  to
take a different view than the one taken by the trial Court.  The  behaviour
of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying  and  horrible.   One  would
find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and  peace  of
mind.  Such torture would adversely affect the life of the husband.   It  is
also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the matrimonial  house
on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back.  Though not on record,  the
learned counsel submitted that  till  today,  the  Respondent  wife  is  not
staying with the Appellant.  The daughter of the  Appellant  and  Respondent
has also grown up and according to the learned counsel, she  is  working  in
an IT company.  We have  no  reason  to  disbelieve  the  aforestated  facts
because with the passage of time, the daughter must have grown  up  and  the
separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also  become  normal  for
her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be  proper  to  bring  them
together, especially when the Appellant husband was treated  so  cruelly  by
the Respondent wife.

 We, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered  by
the High Court.  The decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001  passed  by
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore  in  M.C.  No.603  of  1995  is
hereby restored.



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                             REPORTABLE

                       

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.3253 OF 2008



NARENDRA                            … APPELLANT


VERSUS



K. MEENA                          … RESPONDENT



                               J U D G M E N T



ANIL R. DAVE, J.



1.    This appeal has been filed by the Appellant husband, whose decree  for
divorce passed by the trial  Court  has  been  set  aside  by  the  impugned
judgment dated 8th March, 2006 passed by the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at
Bangalore in Miscellaneous First Appeal No.171 of 2002 (FC).

  2.  The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in  a  nutshell,  are  as
under :

      The Respondent wife filed Miscellaneous  First  Appeal  under  Section
28(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,  1955  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the
Act”) before the High Court as she was aggrieved by the judgment and  decree
dated 17th November, 2001, passed by  the  Principal  Judge,  Family  Court,
Bangalore in M.C. No.603 of 1995 under Section 13(1)(ia) of  the  Act  filed
by the Appellant husband seeking divorce.

3.    The  Appellant  husband  had  married  the  Respondent  wife  on  26th
February, 1992.  Out of the wedlock, a female child named Ranjitha was  born
on 13th November, 1993.  The case of the Appellant was that  the  Respondent
did not live  happily  with  the  Appellant  even  for  a  month  after  the
marriage.   The  reason  for  filing  the  divorce  petition  was  that  the
Respondent wife had become cruel because of  her  highly  suspicious  nature
and she used to level absolutely frivolous but serious  allegations  against
him regarding his character and more particularly  about  his  extra-marital
relationship.  Behaviour of the Respondent wife made life of  the  Appellant
husband miserable and it became impossible for the Appellant  to  stay  with
the Respondent  for  the  aforestated  reasons.   Moreover,  the  Respondent
wanted the Appellant to leave his parents and other family  members  and  to
get separated from them so that the Respondent can live  independently;  and
in that event it would become more torturous for the Appellant to stay  only
with the Respondent wife with  her  such  nature  and  behaviour.  The  main
ground was cruelty, as serious allegations were  levelled  about  the  moral
character of the Appellant to the  effect  that  he  was  having  an  extra-
marital affair with a maid, named Kamla.  Another important  allegation  was
that the Respondent would very often threaten the Appellant that  she  would
commit suicide.  In fact, on 2th July, 1995, she picked up  a  quarrel  with
the Appellant, went to the bathroom, locked the door from inside and  poured
kerosene on her body and attempted to commit suicide.  On getting  smell  of
kerosene coming from the bathroom, the  Appellant,  his  elder  brother  and
some of the neighbours broke open the door of  the  bathroom  and  prevented
the Respondent wife from committing suicide.   The  aforestated  facts  were
found to be  sufficient  by  the  learned  Family  Court  for  granting  the
Appellant a decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001,  after  considering
the evidence adduced by both the parties.

4.    Being aggrieved by the judgment  and  decree  of  divorce  dated  17th
November, 2001, the Respondent wife had  filed  Miscellaneous  First  Appeal
No.171 of 2002 (FC), which has been allowed by the High Court on 8th  March,
2006, whereby the decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001 has  been  set
aside.  Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High  Court,
the Appellant has filed this appeal.

5.    The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent was not present  when
the appeal was called out for hearing.  The matter was  kept  back  but  for
the whole day, the learned counsel for the Respondent did not appear.   Even
on an earlier occasion on 31st March, 2016, when the appeal was called  out,
the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent wife was  not  present  and
therefore, the Court  had  heard  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
Appellant.

6.    The learned counsel appearing for the  Appellant  submitted  that  the
High Court had committed a grave error in  the  process  of  re-appreciating
the evidence and by setting aside the decree of divorce  granted  in  favour
of the Appellant.  He submitted that there was no  reason  to  believe  that
there was no cruelty on the part of the  Respondent  wife.   He  highlighted
the observations made by the Family Court and took us through the  evidence,
which was recorded before the Family Court.  He drew our  attention  to  the
depositions made by independent witnesses, neighbours of the Appellant,  who
had rescued the Respondent wife from committing  suicide  by  breaking  open
the door of the bathroom when the Respondent was on the verge of  committing
suicide by pouring kerosene on herself and by lighting a match  stick.   Our
attention was also drawn to  the  fact  that  serious  allegations  levelled
against the character of the  Appellant  in  relation  to  an  extra-marital
affair with a maid were absolutely baseless as no maid named Kamla had  ever
worked in the  house  of  the  Appellant.   It  was  also  stated  that  the
Respondent wife was insisting  the  Appellant  to  get  separated  from  his
family members and on 12th July, 1995  i.e.  the  date  of  the  attempt  to
commit  suicide,  the  Respondent  wife  deserted  the  Appellant   husband.
According to the learned counsel, the facts recorded by the  learned  Family
Court after appreciating the evidence  were  sufficient  to  show  that  the
Appellant was entitled to a decree of  divorce  as  per  the  provisions  of
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.

7.    We have carefully gone through the evidence  adduced  by  the  parties
before the trial Court and we tried to find out  as  to  why  the  appellate
Court had taken a different view than the one  taken  by  the  Family  Court
i.e. the trial Court.

8.    The High Court came to the conclusion that there was no cruelty  meted
out to the Appellant, which would enable him to get a decree of divorce,  as
per the  provisions  of  the  Act.   The  allegations  with  regard  to  the
character of the Appellant and the extra-marital affair  with  a  maid  were
taken very seriously by the Family Court, but the High Court  did  not  give
much importance to the false allegations made.  The constant  persuasion  by
the Respondent  for  getting  separated  from  the  family  members  of  the
Appellant and constraining the Appellant to live separately  and  only  with
her was also not considered to be of any importance by the High  Court.   No
importance was given to the incident with regard to  an  attempt  to  commit
suicide made by the Respondent wife.  On the contrary, it appears  that  the
High Court found some justification in the request made  by  the  Respondent
to live separately from the family of the Appellant husband.   According  to
the High Court, the trial Court did not appreciate  the  evidence  properly.
For the aforestated reasons, the High Court reversed  the  findings  arrived
at by the learned Family Court and set aside the decree of divorce.

9.    We do not agree with the manner  in  which  the  High  Court  has  re-
appreciated the evidence and has come to a different conclusion.

10.   With regard to the allegations of cruelty levelled by  the  Appellant,
we are in agreement with the findings of the trial  Court.   First  of  all,
let us look at the incident with regard to an attempt to commit  suicide  by
the Respondent.   Upon  perusal  of  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses,  the
findings arrived at by the trial Court to the  effect  that  the  Respondent
wife had locked herself in the bathroom and had poured kerosene  on  herself
so  as  to  commit  suicide,  are  not  in  dispute.   Fortunately  for  the
Appellant, because of the noise and disturbance, even the neighbours of  the
Appellant rushed to help and the door of the bathroom was  broken  open  and
the Respondent was saved.  Had she been successful in her attempt to  commit
suicide, then one can  foresee  the  consequences  and  the  plight  of  the
Appellant because in that  event  the  Appellant  would  have  been  put  to
immense difficulties because of the legal provisions.  We  feel  that  there
was no fault on the part of the Appellant nor was there any reason  for  the
Respondent wife to make an attempt to  commit  suicide.   No  husband  would
ever be comfortable with or tolerate such an act by  his  wife  and  if  the
wife succeeds in committing  suicide,  then  one  can  imagine  how  a  poor
husband would get entangled into the clutches of law, which would  virtually
ruin his sanity, peace of mind, career and probably his  entire  life.   The
mere idea with regard to facing  legal  consequences  would  put  a  husband
under tremendous stress.  The thought itself is distressing.  Such a  mental
cruelty could not have  been  taken  lightly  by  the  High  Court.  In  our
opinion, only this one event was sufficient for  the  Appellant  husband  to
get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty.  It  is  needless  to  add
that such threats  or  acts  constitute  cruelty.   Our  aforesaid  view  is
fortified by a decision of this Court in  the  case  of  Pankaj  Mahajan  v.
Dimple @ Kajal (2011) 12 SCC  1,  wherein  it  has  been  held  that  giving
repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty.

11.   The Respondent wife wanted the Appellant to  get  separated  from  his
family.  The evidence shows that the family was  virtually  maintained  from
the income of the  Appellant  husband.  It  is  not  a  common  practice  or
desirable culture for a Hindu  son  in  India  to  get  separated  from  the
parents upon getting married at the instance of the  wife,  especially  when
the son is the only earning member in the family.  A  son,  brought  up  and
given education by his parents, has a moral and  legal  obligation  to  take
care and maintain the parents, when they  become  old  and  when  they  have
either no income or have a meagre income.  In  India,  generally  people  do
not subscribe to  the  western  thought,  where,  upon  getting  married  or
attaining majority, the son gets  separated  from  the  family.   In  normal
circumstances, a wife is expected to be  with  the  family  of  the  husband
after the marriage.  She becomes integral to and forms part  of  the  family
of the husband and normally  without  any  justifiable  strong  reason,  she
would never insist that her husband should get  separated  from  the  family
and live only with her.  In the  instant  case,  upon  appreciation  of  the
evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that  merely  for  monetary
considerations, the Respondent wife wanted  to  get  her  husband  separated
from his family.  The averment of the Respondent was to the effect that  the
income of the Appellant was also spent  for  maintaining  his  family.   The
said  grievance  of  the  Respondent  is  absolutely  unjustified.   A   son
maintaining his parents is absolutely normal in Indian  culture  and  ethos.
There is no other reason for which the Respondent wanted  the  Appellant  to
be separated from the family - the sole reason was to enjoy  the  income  of
the Appellant.  Unfortunately, the  High  Court  considered  this  to  be  a
justifiable reason. In the opinion  of  the  High  Court,  the  wife  had  a
legitimate expectation to see that the income of her  husband  is  used  for
her and not for the family members of the Respondent  husband.   We  do  not
see any reason to justify the said  view  of  the  High  Court.   As  stated
hereinabove, in a Hindu society, it is a pious  obligation  of  the  son  to
maintain the parents.  If a wife  makes  an  attempt  to  deviate  from  the
normal practice and normal  custom  of  the  society,  she  must  have  some
justifiable  reason  for  that  and  in  this  case,  we  do  not  find  any
justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of  the  Respondent  wife.
In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this and  no  son  would
like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who  are
also dependent upon his income.  The persistent  effort  of  the  Respondent
wife to constrain the Appellant to be separated from  the  family  would  be
torturous for the husband and in our opinion,  the  trial  Court  was  right
when it came to the conclusion that this constitutes an  act  of  ‘cruelty’.


12.   With regard to the allegations  about  an  extra-marital  affair  with
maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of the  evidence  by  the  High  Court
does not appear to be correct.  There is sufficient evidence to  the  effect
that there was  no  maid  named  Kamla  working  at  the  residence  of  the
Appellant.  Some averment with regard to some relative has been relied  upon
by the High Court to come to a conclusion that there was a lady named  Kamla
but the High Court has  ignored  the  fact  that  the  Respondent  wife  had
levelled  allegations  with  regard  to  an  extra-marital  affair  of   the
Appellant with the maid and not with someone else.  Even if there  was  some
relative named Kamla,  who  might  have  visited  the  Appellant,  there  is
nothing to substantiate the allegations  levelled  by  the  Respondent  with
regard to an extra-marital affair.  True, it is very difficult to  establish
such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true that to suffer  an
allegation pertaining to one’s character of having an  extra-marital  affair
is quite torturous for any person – be it a husband  or  a  wife.   We  have
carefully gone through the evidence but  we  could  not  find  any  reliable
evidence to show  that  the  Appellant  had  an  extra-marital  affair  with
someone.  Except for the baseless and reckless  allegations,  there  is  not
even the slightest evidence that would  suggest  that  there  was  something
like an affair of the Appellant with the maid named by the  Respondent.   We
consider levelling of  absolutely  false  allegations  and  that  too,  with
regard to an extra-marital life to be quite serious and that can  surely  be
a cause for metal cruelty.

13.   This Court, in the  case  of  Vijaykumar  Ramchandra  Bhate  v.  Neela
Vijaykumar Bhate, 2003 (6) SCC 334 has held as under:-

“7.   The question that requires to be answered first is as to  whether  the
averments, accusations and  character  assassination  of  the  wife  by  the
appellant husband in the written statement constitutes  mental  cruelty  for
sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of  the  Act.  The
position of law in this regard has come to  be  well  settled  and  declared
that  levelling  disgusting   accusations   of   unchastity   and   indecent
familiarity with a person outside wedlock and  allegations  of  extramarital
relationship is a  grave  assault  on  the  character,  honour,  reputation,
status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions of  perfidiousness
attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of  an  educated  Indian  wife
and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount to worst form  of
insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to  substantiate  cruelty  in  law,
warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such  allegations  made
in the written statement or suggested in the course of  examination  and  by
way of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has also come to  be
firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the  relevant  portions  of
such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken to  the  findings
recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court. We  find  that  they
are of such quality, magnitude and consequence  as  to  cause  mental  pain,
agony and suffering amounting to the  reformulated  concept  of  cruelty  in
matrimonial law causing profound and  lasting  disruption  and  driving  the
wife to  feel  deeply  hurt  and  reasonably  apprehend  that  it  would  be
dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting her like that  and
rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible.”


14.   Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, we are inclined  to
hold that the unsubstantiated allegations levelled by  the  Respondent  wife
and the threats and attempt to commit suicide  by  her  amounted  to  mental
cruelty and therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved by a decree  of
divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.

15.   Taking an overall  view  of  the  entire  evidence  and  the  judgment
delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there was  no  need  to
take a different view than the one taken by the trial Court.  The  behaviour
of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying  and  horrible.   One  would
find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and  peace  of
mind.  Such torture would adversely affect the life of the husband.   It  is
also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the matrimonial  house
on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back.  Though not on record,  the
learned counsel submitted that  till  today,  the  Respondent  wife  is  not
staying with the Appellant.  The daughter of the  Appellant  and  Respondent
has also grown up and according to the learned counsel, she  is  working  in
an IT company.  We have  no  reason  to  disbelieve  the  aforestated  facts
because with the passage of time, the daughter must have grown  up  and  the
separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also  become  normal  for
her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be  proper  to  bring  them
together, especially when the Appellant husband was treated  so  cruelly  by
the Respondent wife.

16.   We, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered  by
the High Court.  The decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001  passed  by
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore  in  M.C.  No.603  of  1995  is
hereby restored.

17.   The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.



                                                             .…………………………….J.
                                        (ANIL R. DAVE)



                                                             ……………………………..J.
                               (L. NAGESWARA RAO)
NEW DELHI

OCTOBER 06, 2016.