Friday, August 3, 2018

ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in India.

In the matter of Darshan Gupta vs. Radhika Gupta, (2013) 9 SCC 149. Towards the same end, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced yet another submission. The learned counsel representing the appellant sought dissolution of marriage on the ground that the matrimonial ties between the parties had irretrievably broken down. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that this Court would be justified in annulling the marriage between the parties, especially when the parties have lived apart for more than 12 years. Inviting this Courts attention to the intervention at the instance of this Court, in compliance wherewith the parties had made a last-ditch effort to live together, and had actually taken up residence in an independent flat in Hyderabad on 29-9-2011, it was pointed out that they could not persuade themselves into a relationship of cordiality. It was, therefore, sought to be suggested that there was no likelihood of the parties ever living together as husband and wife. It was accordingly submitted that this Court should consider the annulment of the matrimonial ties between the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
At the present juncture, it is questionable as to whether the relief sought by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available to him. The reason for us to say so is based on a judgment rendered by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, wherein this Court has held as under:
10. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.

If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.

There has been a lot of brainstorming with regard to the efficacy and societal impact that this ground would have if it is made as a ground for divorce. On the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, the Legislature in its wisdom would amend the Hindu Marriage Act to bring within its fold the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. However it is expected that watertight safeguards are introduced so as not to send the message that now divorce has become a cakewalk.

In the matter of Sangeetha Vs Jitender Bhandari, The Hon’ble Madras High Court held that” Coming to the point raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/husband that there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the same cannot be invoked in this case, as one of the parties, viz. the appellant/wife is interested in living with the respondent/husband, which is quite evident from the fact that she did not even think of filing a petition claiming monthly maintenance from her husband. That apart, irretrievable breakdown of marriage has not been incorporated as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.”


                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS         
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUDHAKAR
and
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.VAIDYANATHAN
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos.168 and 169 of 2012
Sangeetha                                                                                                                                   ... Appellant in both appeals
                                                                                                                                                               VS                                                                                                                                        
Jitendra Bhandari                                                                                                                      ... Respondent in both appeals Civil Miscellaneous Appeals filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the common judgment and decree dated 25.11.2011 made in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai.                                     For Appellant in both appeals       :  Mrs.K.Santhakumari…                                                                                For Respondent in both appeals :  Mr.V.T.Gopalan, Senior Counsel                                                                                                               for Mr.P.Krisna                                                                                                                 
J U D G M E N T
S.VAIDYANATHAN,J.
Aggrieved by the order of dissolution of marriage dated 25.11.2011 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011, the appellant/wife has come up with the above appeals.
2.Since the issue involved in both the cases is one and the same, the appeals are taken up for disposal by a common judgment.
3.Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The marriage between the respondent/husband and the appellant/wife was solemnized on 28.06.1998 at Vijayashree Mahal, Anna Nagar, Chennai, as per customary rites. They both belong to orthodox Jain community. From the wedlock, they have two male children. The respondent/husband is running a shop dealing with Electrical accessories and the appellant is a house-wife. The respondent/husband initially filed a petition in O.P.No.1942 of 2008 seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. Thereafter, the appellant/wife filed a petition in O.P.No.218 of 2011 praying for restitution of conjugal rights, which got dismissed. The Principal Family Court, Chennai took up both these petitions together and passed a common order dissolving the marriage on the ground of cruelty in favour of the husband. The aggrieved wife is before this Court now.
4.Before proceeding to analyze the correctness of the order of dissolution of marriage, for better appreciation of the case, contentions of both the husband and wife in their respective petitions, need to be looked into.
5.In the petition filed by the respondent/husband on 30.04.2008 for dissolution of the marriage, it was inter alia, stated as follows:
(a) After marriage, the appellant/wife often went to her parent's house and used to compel the respondent/husband to come out of his joint family. She is in the habit of troubling the respondent/husband to lend money to her parents and her relatives. Also, she used to threaten the respondent/husband that she will commit suicide and her attempt to commit suicide was thwarted by the respondent/husband more than once.
(b)On 05.11.2005, the appellant/wife demanded money from the respondent/husband and he in turn told her that he had already lent enough money to her parents and that he cannot give any money further to her family. Again on 06.11.2005, she asked for money from her husband, while he was in an angry mood. Immediately, the respondent/husband started for going out. While he reached the ground floor, where his driver was also standing, they saw the appellant/wife attempting to jump from their balcony, which is in the 2nd floor of the Apartment. Though the respondent/husband shouted at her not to jump, she jumped off the 2nd floor. Immediately, he took her to First Med Apollo Hospital and admitted her. The appellant/wife underwent treatment there and thereafter, the respondent/husband shifted her to Main Apollo Hospital and one Dr.Sajan Heggede told the respondent/husband that the appellant/wife had a fracture in the Spinal Cord. On 08.11.2005, the appellant/wife underwent operation on her Spinal Cord and was shifted to I.C.U. While so, police came for enquiry and the appellant/wife gave a statement that her gold bangle slipped and in an attempt to catch hold of the same, she slipped and fell from the 2nd floor.
(c)Thereafter, when the appellant/wife was admitted in Vellore Hospital, neither her parents nor her relatives took care of her and it is only the respondent/husband who looked after her in the hospital and their two children, who were studying in school. Even after such incident, the appellant/wife never used to speak with the respondent/husband smoothly. Thereafter, at the behest of the appellant/wife, she was shifted from Vellore Hospital to her parent's house and she was in the custody of her parents and their children were in the custody of the respondent/husband.
(d)According to the respondent/husband, differences arose between him and the appellant/wife right from the day of marriage. Moreover, she has sustained spinal cord and pelvic fracture and is in a vegetative state. The appellant/wife is in the habit of giving trouble to the respondent/husband by threatening him that she will commit suicide. As there is no possibility of reconciliation between them, the respondent/husband wanted to dissolve the marriage and filed a petition in O.P.No.1942 of 2008 seeking dissolution of marriage.
6.Denying the averments made in the petition for divorce, the appellant/wife filed a counter affidavit stating that there was no question of demanding any money by the appellant/wife and her parents from the respondent/husband, as the parents of the appellant/wife are themselves in a good and sound financial status. Further, it is her contention that the respondent/husband has not even discharged his marital obligations of taking care of the appellant/wife at the time of crisis and expending money on her ailment. She has further stated that on account of her fall and spinal injury, she is definitely not in a position to attend to her regular chores. This will certainly not entitle the respondent/husband to seek dissolution of marriage and that the injuries suffered by her on account of the fall is only for a short period and she is ready and willing to come back to her marital duties within a reasonable time.
7.The case was taken up for trial. The respondent/husband was examined as P.W.1; the appellant/wife was examined as P.W.2; one Pranav, the elder son of the appellant and the respondent, was examined as C.W.1 and one Gaurav, the nephew of the respondent/husband, was examined as C.W.2. On behalf of the respondent/husband, five Exhibits were marked, details of which are as follows:
Ex.P1 Legal Notice dated 20.04.2008 issued by the petitioner's counsel to the respondent Ex.P2 Medical Reports (Series), dated 17.11.2005 Ex.P3 Marriage Certificate, dated 03.09.2002 Ex.P4 Marriage Photo Ex.P5 Copy of Petition in O.P.No.218/2011 On behalf of the appellant/wife, no document was marked. The parties were cross-examined. The respondent/husband was cross-examined on 15.02.2010. In the cross-examination, he reiterated the statements made in his affidavit for divorce.
8.On 18.01.2011, the appellant/wife filed a petition in O.P.No.218 of 2011, wherein, it is stated as follows:
(a)The marriage between the appellant/wife and the respondent/husband was solemnized on 28.06.1998 and initially everything went on smoothly, but after sometime, the respondent started showing his anger towards the appellant. He is a very short-tempered person and whenever he is angry, he has no decency of words and language he uses. The worst thing is that even if he cools down, he never feels sorry for his words and deeds. Whenever the appellant/wife asked him as to why he is behaving in such a manner, he would say that his character is so and it is for her to adjust accordingly. The appellant/wife did try to adjust during her entire matrimonial life. She tried to mend his words, but he refused to listen to any of her requests.
(b)During the year 2003, after the birth of the second child, the appellant/wife's brother Deepak opened a Sports Centre in Vepery. At that point of time, the respondent/husband had volunteered Rs.10,000/- for its renovation, but later on, started abusing the appellant's brother for not returning the money. In November 2005, during Deepawali, he called the appellant's brother and shouted at him for non-payment of money. The appellant's brother immediately handed over money to his sister, which again kindled anger in the respondent. The appellant could not bear the abusive language uttered by the respondent against her family members. When the appellant's brother came to know that the respondent expected him to come personally to hand over the money, he immediately met him and said sorry to the respondent/husband. He tried to convince him that he had no such intention to hurt him and make him angry. After her brother left, the respondent/husband shouted at her in anger and took his things to go to Kilpuak. The couple stayed at Vepery for a short time.
(c)On 05.11.2005, the appellant/wife was waiting for the respondent/husband to come home, till midnight. The next day morning, when he came home, he saw the appellant/wife waiting for him in the balcony. While so, she was holding her bangles in her hand. When the bangles fell down, in order to catch hold of them, she bent herself and in that process, she fell down from the balcony. The driver who was standing in the ground floor caught hold of her upper body, but the lower part of her body was hit hard on the floor. Then, she was taken to First Medical Hospital for treatment. The Doctors informed her that her lower spinal cord was injured seriously and she had a pelvis fracture. She underwent surgery on 08.11.2005. The respondent/husband was helpful to her at that time. The Police took statement about the incident. Later, she took one month bed rest at Kilpauk and was later readmitted in Apollo Hospital for five days.
(d)When the appellant wanted to meet her parents, the respondent took her to her parental home. He also took her to CMC Rehabilitation Centre for physiotherapy treatment. The appellant stayed there for three months and learnt to walk on Calipers with crutches. During that time, misunderstanding arose between the family members of the appellant and the respondent. When she was discharged from CMC, the respondent gave an ultimatum to her that if she wanted to live with him, she should sever her ties with her family members. The appellant/wife had no other choice but to accept it. After taking the appellant to home, the respondent took good care of her. But, slowly he started getting irritated for no reason and started shouting at the appellant. She was permitted to stay in the second floor, but the kitchen was in the ground floor. She was unable to cook or help her mother-in-law in the kitchen, but tried her level best to do household work.
(e)The appellant/wife had to drag herself from the second floor to the ground floor of the house to do the work, due to which she developed bedsore. Slowly, she started washing clothes, dusting bed sheets and cleaning toilets. At the initial stage itself, she requested to appoint a maidservant to take care of her, but the respondent failed to do so, for reasons best known to him. When she was suffering from severe fever, instead of taking her to the hospital, he called a physician and asked her to undergo treatment under him. Day by day, the respondent developed hatred towards the appellant and mentally tortured her for petty reasons and kept cursing the appellant's parents. He abused the appellant's mother and sister in vulgar language.
(f)In July 2007, when the appellant's health condition worsened, the respondent, instead of taking care of her, went out of station without informing the appellant. Hence, the appellant took permission of her mother-in-law to go to her parental home and called her mother and brother-in-law to take her for treatment. When the respondent came to know of the appellant's stay at her parental home, he got wild and told her that since she had gone out of the matrimonial home without his permission, he will not allow her to come back to her marital home. Further, he demanded divorce from the appellant and all her efforts to convince him went in vain.
(g)Due to regular treatment and care with love and affection at her parental home, bedsore and other problems got healed and she was able to move around the house with the help of a wheel chair and do her duties. Though the appellant's relatives and well-wishers tried to patch up things between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent was reluctant to join her. The respondent/husband started spreading false stories that the appellant's parents were demanding money from him. According to the appellant/wife, when her parents had given Rs.5,00,000/- as dowry besides gold, silver and other household articles at the time of her marriage with the respondent, he wantonly belittled the appellant and her family members by saying that they are after his money.
(h)According to the appellant/wife, her condition is better and she is capable of leading matrimonial life. Though she wanted to join her husband, because of the divorce petition filed by her husband, she could not do so. Even now, the respondent/husband insists that she should give her consent for divorce, so that their children will live peacefully. He wanted to have a second marriage and lead a peaceful life with another woman. Though the appellant/wife needs financial support from her husband for her treatment, she has not claimed the same in the interest of joining her husband.
9.The Principal Family Court, Chennai, by a common order dated 25.11.2011 in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011, granted divorce to the appellant/wife. Relevant portion of the said order would read thus:
25.Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling of one of the spouse due to the behavioural pattern by the other spouse. The major suicidal attempt on 06.11.2005, if viewed on the basis of record as well as on evidence, there is no alternative but to conclude that the respondent caused mental cruelty to her husband by her conduct.
26.In the instant case, mental cruelty is the conduct of the respondent which caused mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the petitioner. Therefore, the apprehension on the part of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent wife cannot be termed as ordinary wear and tear of married life. It is extremely difficult for any person to live with his wife who had the tendency to commit suicide often.
33.The petitioner used to attend the court for few hearings in a old rusted wheel chair assisted by her father and a servant maid. At the request of the court, petitioner husband bought a new wheel chair and offered it to the respondent wife and the respondent wife was also kind enough to accept the offer. In this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to refer para 19 of the written submission filed on behalf of the petitioner husband. The submission of facts raised in para 19 is denied by the respondent wife. After filing of the written submission, when court posed a question to the petitioner as to whether he can pay Rs.10,000/- p.m. to his wife as maintenance even though no petition has been filed by the wife for maintenance. The petitioner offered to pay Rs.5,000/-p.m. as maintenance. This was happened subsequent to the filing of written submission of both the parties. The respondent wife is a physically challenged person. Having considered her position, the petitioner is directed to comply with the assurance given to the court in respect of future maintenance admitted by him.
34.In view of the above analysis and evaluation of incidents on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record as well as on the basis of the law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there is no option open to the Court but to conclude that any rigid view to keep the marriage between the parties indissoluble in the name of stability would not serve any purpose of the marriage in the facts situation of the instance case. The consequences of preserving the unworkable marriage would put the parties into greater misery than separation. Hence, I am constrained to grant divorce on the ground of cruelty in favour of the petitioner.
35.... In the result, the petition in F.C.O.P.No.1942/2008 is allowed as prayed for by granting an order of divorce on the ground of cruelty and thereby the marriage held on 28.06.1998 between the petitioner and respondent is hereby dissolved.
10.Mrs.K.Santhakumari, learned counsel for the appellant/wife would contend that the finding of the Family Court against the appellant/wife in respect of the incident on 06.11.2005 is wholly unsustainable in view of the statement of C.W.1, the child of the parties to the effect that his mother, in her attempt to catch hold of the gold bangle that slipped off her hand, fell down accidentally from the balcony. Also, she would strenuously contend that the Family Court ought to have seen that the respondent/husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage with a clear intention to get rid of the appellant/wife, who has been physically affected and to get remarried, even according to the admissions in his own evidence. According to her, the appellant/wife is always willing to live with her husband and she never even filed a petition seeking interim maintenance.
11.In support of her case, learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions:
(i)Subhash Chander Sharma vs. Anjali Sharma, II (2010) DMC 831 24. However it is a catch situation as this ground can ease the way for many who are under the burden of a doomed relationship to a breather but at the same time it may give an opportunity to the ones trying to maneuver the alleys of law for their self conceited motives.
25. There has been a lot of brainstorming with regard to the efficacy and societal impact that this ground would have if it is made as a ground for divorce. On the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, the Legislature in its wisdom would amend the Hindu Marriage Act to bring within its fold the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. However it is expected that watertight safeguards are introduced so as not to send the message that now divorce has become a cakewalk.
26. Henceforth, there are some key areas that need to be pondered upon. The ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage cannot be resorted to as a strait jacket formula leading to the institution of marriage becoming so fragile that the wrong doer abuses it for his selfish ends leaving the other party in lurch. But it is only when the court is satisfied that the marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and there is no chance of their coming together should the court open the deadlock of wedlock.
(ii) Neelam Kumar vs. Dayarani, II (2010) DMC 198 (SC) 13.We are not impressed by this submission at all. There is nothing to indicate that the respondent has contributed in anyway to the alleged breakdown of the marriage. If a party to a marriage, by his own conduct brings the relationship to a point of irretrievable breakdown, he/she cannot be allowed to seek divorce on the ground of breakdown of the marriage. That would simply mean giving someone the benefits of his/her own misdeeds. Moreover, in a later decision of this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, II (2008) DMC 167 (SC) = VI (2008) SLT 289 = (2009) 6 SCC 379, it has been held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce as it is not contemplated under Section 13 and granting divorce on this ground alone would amount to adding a clause therein by a judicial verdict which would amount to legislation by Court. In the concluding paragraph of this judgment, the Court observed:
If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the Legislature and not by the Court. It is for the Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the Courts.
(iii) Gourab Datta vs. Smt. Arundhuti Majumder (Datta), AIR 2011 Gauhati 183 24.As provided by Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a petitioner, seeking divorce is required to prove the existence of the grounds, provided in the said Section. In the present case, the only ground taken by the appellant was cruelty which is a ground seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Here, the term petitioner indicates either the husband or the wife, as the case may be. A petitioner, in order to get a decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, is required to prove that he or she has been treated with cruelty by the other side. As discussed above, there is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellant i.e. the husband was treated with cruelty by the respondent.
Therefore, on careful perusal of the entire evidence on record and in the light of the decisions cited above, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant-husband failed to establish that he was treated with cruelty by the respondent-wife. Therefore, the appellant failed to substantiate the ground, taken by him, for seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage. In view of the above, we find no difficulty in holding that the learned trial Judge committed no error by refusing to grant the prayer for divorce. Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal requiring interference with the impugned judgment and order.
(iv) Jayashree vs. S.Suresh, (2012) III DMC 465 (DB) 27.The other contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, is that the petitioner is not entitled to get a decree in his favour in view of Section 23(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 23(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act stipulates that if the Court is satisfied that where the ground of divorce petition is cruelty, the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, the Court shall decree such relief accordingly. In the present case, in paragraph No.12 of the petition, the petitioner has averred that he never took drastic steps of initiating proceedings to dissolve the marriage because he was interested in the welfare of his children and lived with the respondent for more than 10 years. It is also averred in paragraph No.5 of the petition, that the respondent used to leave the matrimonial home often and the petitioner would bring her back and live with her till she finally left the matrimonial home on 18.5.2004. Even if the allegations of cruelty mentioned in the petition, are taken as true for the sake of argument, the petitioner has condoned the cruelty by his acts in bringing her back to the matrimonial home and living with her. In fact, the respondent left the matrimonial home on 18.5.2004, and the petition seeking for divorce, has been filed in the month of July 2004. Hence as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the petitioner is not entitled to get a decree in his favour in view of Section 23(1)(b) of Hindu Marriage Act.
(v) Darshan Gupta vs. Radhika Gupta, (2013) 9 SCC 1 49. Towards the same end, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced yet another submission. The learned counsel representing the appellant sought dissolution of marriage on the ground that the matrimonial ties between the parties had irretrievably broken down. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that this Court would be justified in annulling the marriage between the parties, especially when the parties have lived apart for more than 12 years. Inviting this Courts attention to the intervention at the instance of this Court, in compliance wherewith the parties had made a last-ditch effort to live together, and had actually taken up residence in an independent flat in Hyderabad on 29-9-2011, it was pointed out that they could not persuade themselves into a relationship of cordiality. It was, therefore, sought to be suggested that there was no likelihood of the parties ever living together as husband and wife. It was accordingly submitted that this Court should consider the annulment of the matrimonial ties between the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
50. At the present juncture, it is questionable as to whether the relief sought by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available to him. The reason for us to say so is based on a judgment rendered by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, wherein this Court has held as under:
10. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that this Court in some cases has dissolved a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. In our opinion, those cases have not taken into consideration the legal position which we have mentioned above, and hence they are not precedents. A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent.
12. If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.
13. Had both the parties been willing we could, of course, have granted a divorce by mutual consent as contemplated by Section 13-B of the Act, but in this case the respondent is not willing to agree to a divorce.
53. Since we were not agreeable with the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the plea of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the learned counsel sought the same relief, for the same reasons, by imploring us to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and to annul the marriage between the parties, as a matter of doing complete justice between the parties. Doing justice between the parties is clearly a constitutional obligation. This Court has been bestowed with the discretion  to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it . The concept of justice, however, varies depending on the interest of the party. On most occasions, it is advisable to adjudicate matters in consonance with law. Whenever it is possible to do so on the touchstone of the Courts conscience, the determination rendered would simultaneously result in doing justice between the parties. All the same, since we have been called upon to annul the marriage between Darshan Gupta and his wife Radhika Gupta in order to do complete justice to the parties, we have ventured to thoughtfully examine the matter from the instant perspective as well.
54. In the context of doing justice it was suggested, that the appellant would be ready and willing to pay the respondent, whatever was considered appropriate by this Court. We are informed, that the appellant is financially well-to-do. We shall, therefore, keep in our mind the appellants offer while examining the instant issue. We would, in our endeavour to determine the issue in hand, examine the matter by reversing the roles of the parties. We will examine the matter as if the wife had approached the Family Court seeking divorce on the ground that her husband had suffered brain damage leading to cognitive deficiencies. Yet, despite the said deficiencies, his working memory had returned to near normal after treatment. And his mental condition was such that it would not have any effect on his matrimonial obligations. And the wifes family is agreeable to pay an amount to be determined by this Court (just as the husband Darshan Gupta has offered), so as to enable their daughter to break away, and find a more suitable match. Should she have been granted freedom from her matrimonial ties, in the given facts, in order to do complete justice to the parties? We would ask ourselves, whether the husband would have accepted such a plea, in the facts denoted above? In such situation, if this Court had, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, granted compensation to the husband, and had dissolved his marriage on the pretext of doing complete justice between the parties, would the same be acceptable to the husband? We have no doubt in our mind, that on a reversal of roles, the husband, without any fault of his own, would have never accepted as just the dissolution of his matrimonial ties, even if the couple had been separated for a duration as is the case in hand. Especially, if the husband had, right from the beginning, fervently expressed the desire to restore his matrimonial relationship with his wife and to live a normal life with her.
12.Per contra, Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent/husband would contend that the appellant/wife caused mental torture to the respondent/wife by often threatening him that she will commit suicide, thereby disturbing the harmony in the family. He would fairly submit that the respondent/husband has provided all facilities to the appellant/wife from the date of the injury till she left for her maternal home. It is his further contention that the appellant/wife filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights only in the year 2011 and it is an afterthought. It clearly shows that she never had the intention to live with the respondent/husband and only in order to extort money and to defeat the divorce petition filed on account of cruelty, she has filed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that the order of divorce granted by the Family Court has to be confirmed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
13.To substantiate his stand that the appellant/wife has caused cruelty to the respondent/husband, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following decisions:
(i) a decision of this Court in the case of Sumitran Rober vs. Sophia, 2001 (3) LW 649, 14.Arguing on the standard of proof of adultery in matrimonial cases, the learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that the standard of proof required in a criminal case cannot be applied for the proceedings in matrimonial cases and the petitioner who alleged adultery is only required to prove the allegations by preponderance of probability. It cannot be disputed that the allegations as to the adultery have to be proved by preponderance of probability. But it has to be necessarily stated that it is well established that the petition for divorce on the charges of adultery should not be allowed merely on suspicion and doubts expressed by the party approaching the court. As stated above, the petitioner has clearly averred in paragraph 11 of the petition that he became suspicious of the conduct of the respondent. In the instant case, the averments made in the petition and the evidence adduced are not sufficient to hold that the respondent has committed adultery. On the contrary the available evidence would throw suspicion and doubt over the petitioner's case whether an incident could have taken place on 29.04.1997 as urged by the petitioner's side. Thus on both grounds for not impleading the adulterer as co-respondent and on the ground of not proving the adulterous conduct of the respondent, the petition has to necessarily fail. The respondent has categorically admitted that at no point of time, the petitioner deserted herself. Under such circumstances, the request of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights in the counter claim cannot be considered. The above issues are answered accordingly.
(ii) Geeta Jagadish Mangtani vs. Jagdish Mangtani, 2005 (8) SCC 177 5. We are of the view that these observations of the High Court are fully justified in the facts of the present case. One has to particularly note the fact that the parties knew even prior to marriage whatever they were earning. The earnings of the wife from a government job before the marriage was more than double of that of the husband. With the knowledge of this fact the parties entered into matrimonial alliance. The marriage survived only for a brief period of about seven months. After 2-6-1993 till the exchange of notices and replies during September to December 1996 and filing of the divorce petition ultimately by the husband on 31-12-1996, there has been no attempt on the part of the wife to stay with the husband. She is a school teacher and it is common knowledge that in schools there are long vacations during summer months, more so, in government schools where the wife teaches. At least during those holidays she could have visited the husband at Ulhasnagar along with her son and stayed with him. There is nothing on record to show that any such attempt was ever made by her to visit the husband during this entire period. She has stated in her evidence that the husband used to come and stay with her during her vacations. This has been denied by the husband. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable, that there was never any attempt on the part of the wife to go to her husbands house i.e. matrimonial home of the parties after she left on 2-6-1993. From this fact alone animus deserendi on the part of the wife is clearly established. She has chosen to adopt a course of conduct which proves desertion on her part. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that this desertion on the part of the wife was with a reasonable cause. Such a course of conduct over a long period indicates total abandonment of marriage and cannot be justified on the ground of monetary consideration alone as a reasonable cause to desert. It also amounts to wilful neglect of the husband by the wife. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the High Court appears to be absolutely correct in the facts and circumstances of the case. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
(iii) Naveen Kholi vs. Nellu Kohli, 2006 (4) SCC 558 86. In view of the fact that the parties have been living separately for more than 10 years and a very large number of aforementioned criminal and civil proceedings have been initiated by the respondent against the appellant and some proceedings have been initiated by the appellant against the respondent, the matrimonial bond between the parties is beyond repair. A marriage between the parties is only in name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.
91. Before we part with this case, on consideration of the totality of facts, this Court would like to recommend the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps.
(iv) Mayadevi vs. Jagdish Prasad, 2007 (3) SCC 136 8. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the instances highlighted by the trial court and analysed in great detail by the High Court clearly made out a case for dowry (sic cruelty) and no interference is called for in this appeal.
9. 10. The expression cruelty has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of the spouse same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.
11. The expression cruelty has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. (See Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi.)
12. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be grave and weighty so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than ordinary wear and tear of married life. The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party.
13. The court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouses conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.
14. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each others fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exaggerated and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case and as noted above, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A too technical and hypersensitive approach would be counterproductive to the institution of marriage. The courts do not have to deal with ideal husbands and ideal wives. It has to deal with a particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a mere ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to matrimonial court.
(v) Rishikesh Sharma vs. Saroj Sharma, 2007 (2) SCC 263 4. We heard Mr A.K. Chitale, learned Senior Counsel and Mr S.S. Dahiya, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the judgment passed by both the trial court and also of the High Court. It is not in dispute that the respondent is living separately from the year 1981. Though the finding has been rendered by the High Court that the wife last resided with her husband up to 25-3-1989, the said finding according to the learned counsel for the appellant is not correct. In view of the several litigations between the parties it is not possible for her to prosecute criminal case against the husband and at the same time continue to reside with her husband. In the instant case the marriage is irretrievably broken down with no possibility of the parties living together again. Both the parties have crossed 49 years and living separately and working independently since 1981. There being a history of litigation with the respondent wife repeatedly filing criminal cases against the appellant which could not be substantiated as found by the courts. This apart, only child born in the wedlock in 1975 has already been given in marriage. Under such circumstances the High Court was not justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of the appellant. This apart, the wife also has made certain allegations against her husband, that the husband has already remarried and is living with another lady as stated by her in the written statement. The High Court also has not considered the allegations made by the respondent which have been repeatedly made and repeatedly found baseless by the courts.
5. In our opinion it will not be possible for the parties to live together and therefore there is no purpose in compelling both the parties to live together. Therefore, the best course in our opinion is to dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce so that the parties who are litigating since 1981 and have lost valuable part of life can live peacefully for remaining part of their life.
6. During the last hearing both the husband and wife were present in the Court. The husband was ready and willing to pay a lump sum amount by way of permanent alimony to the wife. The wife was not willing to accept the lump sum amount but however expressed her willingness to live with her husband. We are of the opinion that her desire to live with her husband at this stage and at this distance of time is not genuine. Therefore, we are not accepting this suggestion made by the wife and reject the same.
(vi) S.Latha Kunjamma vs. Anil Kumar, 2008 (11) KLJ 49 7. False, defamatory, scandalous, malicious, baseless and unproved allegations made against the spouse in the written statement may amount to cruelty. The irresponsible insinuation and allegations which were made during the course of litigation against the wife cannot be brushed aside. Such a view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the decision reported in Parihar v. Parihar . Pushparani v. Krishan Lal is a case where the wife had in her written statement alleged that an illicit relationship existed between her husband and one Smt. Bindra Devi. When the husband appeared in the witness box the said statement was directly suggested to him in the cross-examination. This imputation was not ground pleaded in the petition by the husband it was held by the Delhi High Court that the allegations of adultery made by the wife in the written statement and at the time of cross-examination could be taken into consideration for granting a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. The learned Judge had followed the principle that cruelty subsequent to the institution of the petition could be taken into account to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.
16. No doubt, the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish her case. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a higher standard proof in trials involving enquiry into issues of criminal nature. The ground of desertion upon which the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed does not require that the petitioner must prove her case beyond all reasonable doubt in matrimonial proceedings. The court below was therefore in error in holding that the proof adduced by the petitioner as PW1 is not sufficient proof for supporting the ground of desertion. The standard of proof required in matrimonial cases under the Act is not to establish the grounds alleged beyond reasonable doubt but merely one to find out whether the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the said fact alleged. 
(vii)Ravikumar vs. Julmidevi, 2010 (4) SCC 476 19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty.
(viii) Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple @ Kajal, 2011 (12) SCC 1 3. After the marriage, the appellant husband found that the respondent wife was acting in a very abnormal manner, as she used to abruptly get very aggressive, hostile and suspicious in nature. In a fit of anger, she used to give threats that she would bring an end to her life by committing suicide and involve the appellant husband and his family members in a criminal case, unless she was provided a separate residence. On one occasion, she attempted to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace but was saved because of timely intervention of the appellant husband.
35. It is well settled that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. When such a thing is repeated in the form of sign or gesture, no spouse can live peacefully. In the case on hand, the appellant husband has placed adequate materials to show that the respondent wife used to give repeated threats to commit suicide and once even tried to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace. Cruelty postulates a treatment of a spouse with such cruelty as to create reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the other party. The acts of the respondent wife are of such quality or magnitude and consequence as to cause pain, agony and suffering to the appellant husband which amounted to cruelty in matrimonial law.
(ix) K.Srinivasa Rao vs. D.A.Deepa, 2013 (5) SCC 226 34. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent wife has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellant husband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain and anguish. In this Court the respondent wife expressed that she wants to go back to the appellant husband, but, that is not possible now. The appellant husband is not willing to take her back. Even if we refuse decree of divorce to the appellant husband, there are hardly any chances of the respondent wife leading a happy life with the appellant husband because a lot of bitterness is created by the conduct of the respondent wife.
35. In Vijaykumar (2003 (6) SCC 334), it was submitted that if the decree of divorce is set aside, there may be fresh avenues and scope for reconciliation between parties. This Court observed that judged in the background of all surrounding circumstances, the claim appeared to be too desolate, merely born out of despair rather than based upon any real, concrete or genuine purpose or aim. In the facts of this case we feel the same.
36. While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce must be granted, we are alive to the plight of the respondent wife. The appellant husband is working as an Assistant Registrar in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He is getting a good salary. The respondent wife fought the litigation for more than 10 years. She appears to be entirely dependent on her parents and on her brother, therefore, her future must be secured by directing the appellant husband to give her permanent alimony. In the facts and circumstance of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant husband should be directed to pay a sum of Rs 15,00,000 (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) to the respondent wife as and by way of permanent alimony.
14.We have heard the learned counsel on either side, gave careful consideration to their submissions, perused the decisions relied on by them and the material documents available on record.
15.The issue before us is whether the Court below is right in granting the decree of divorce against the appellant/wife on the ground of cruelty. Though, according to the respondent/husband, the appellant/wife sustained injuries on 06.11.2005 only as a result of an attempt to commit suicide, the version of the appellant/wife is that she fell down accidentally from the second floor balcony in an attempt to catch hold of the gold bangle that slipped from her hand. Admittedly, the appellant/wife suffered fracture in her spinal cord and pelvis and is now moving around only in a wheel-chair. Though the Family Court has come to a conclusion that only being frustrated at the respondent's refusal to lend money to her parents, the appellant/wife indulged in suicidal attempt by jumping from the balcony of the second floor, whether the injuries sustained by her on 06.11.2005 is due to the intentional jump or the accidental fall from the balcony of the 2nd floor of her house, can be decided only by fair appreciation of evidence. Any prudent person will doubt the reason assigned by the respondent/husband for the suicide attempt of the appellant/wife.

16.It is seen that when the appellant/wife sustained injuries on 06.11.2005, she was immediately taken to hospital by her husband, wherein, the Doctors have reported that the appellant/wife sustained fracture on her spinal cord and pelvis. On 08.11.2005, the appellant/wife underwent operation on her Spinal Cord and shifted to I.C.U. It has to be noted that when the police came for enquiry, the appellant/wife gave a statement that her gold bangle slipped from her hand and in an attempt to catch hold of the same, she slipped and fell from the 2nd floor balcony. Also, in her affidavit for restitution of conjugal rights, the appellant/wife has stated that on 06.11.2005, when she was waiting in the balcony of her house for her husband to return, gold bangle slipped from her hands and in the attempt to catch hold of the same, she fell down and sustained injuries.

17.With regard to the said incident, the Court below examined the elder son of the appellant and the respondent, viz. Pranav, studying VII standard, as C.W.1. To the question as to how such accident occurred, he answered that his mother jumped from the balcony. When he was questioned as to why his mother jumped, he stated that since it was a Sunday, he, his brother Kush, his cousins Gaurav and Neerav and the children of his father's friends were all present in his house and that he is not aware of the reason of his mother jumping from the balcony. Again, when he was questioned as to how his mother fell the balcony, he stated that his mother fell down from the 2nd floor balcony of his house, in an attempt to catch hold of the bangle which slipped from her hand.
18.The other child witness, Gaurav, who is the nephew of the respondent/husband was examined by the Court below as C.W.2. He has stated that on the date of the alleged incident, he along with his brothers saw his aunt, i.e. the appellant herein, jumping from the balcony and denied the statement that she fell down in an attempt to catch hold of her bangle. He has also stated that he is not aware of the reason as to why his aunt jumped from the balcony. According to him, at the time of accident, he was inside the house of his Uncle, i.e. the respondent herein and only when he came down from the 2nd floor to his house at the ground floor, he saw his aunt falling from the balcony.
19.A careful analysis of the evidence of Gaurav would show that though he had been in the house of his Uncle, i.e. the respondent herein before the fall of the appellant, during the fall of the appellant, he came down to ground floor and witnessed the incident only from the ground floor. Therefore, he might not be aware as to whether she jumped or fell from the balcony. Whereas, Pranav, the son of the appellant and the respondent, who was in his house at the time of accident, has clearly stated that his mother fell down from the balcony in an attempt to catch hold of the bangle that slipped from her hand. Thus, it is crystal clear that Gaurav has not witnessed the fall of the appellant from the balcony and he is certainly not aware as to why and how she fell from the balcony. Hence, the evidence of Gaurav is contradictory and cannot be believed.

20.In the cross-examination, the respondent/husband has stated that he has not registered any complaint regarding the appellant's attempt to commit suicide and that he took the appellant/wife to Hospital for treatment. It is his further evidence that he appointed a servant-maid to take care of the appellant/wife and that on 24.07.2007, when his wife left for her parent's house, on 27.07.2007, over phone, he asked her to come back to her matrimonial house. The respondent/husband has also stated that the appellant/wife has mentally tortured him for petty reasons and there was curse, abuse and demand of Rs.5 crores for giving consent divorce. Thereafter, the demand was reduced to Rs.2.5 crores along with an Apartment in her name apart from the maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month. The respondent/husband would submit that the intention of the appellant/wife is only to extort money from him and she had no intention to live with him and take care of her children.
21.Even assuming that the appellant/wife had attempted to commit suicide on 06.11.2005, what prevented the respondent/husband from informing the same to the police, when he has stated in his affidavit that the incident which took place on 06.11.2005 is not first of its kind and that the appellant/wife had attempted to commit suicide on earlier occasions also and that the said attempts were thwarted by him. He could have informed the police about her suicide attempt, which can easily be corroborated by the evidence of his family members, driver and neighbours. Moreover, the said incident had occurred after seven years from the date of marriage. So, this Court cannot assume that fearing police case under Dowry Prohibition Act, the respondent/husband has concealed her suicide attempt. Had the appellant/wife really jumped from the balcony with an intention to commit suicide, which it is stated, was witnessed by the husband, children and driver, definitely, the same could have been reported to the police. It is only Pranav, the elder son, who has in his evidence stated that his mother slipped and fell from the balcony. The evidence of the child C.W.1 is in support of the mother. But, the fact remains that both the children are now living with their father and are not willing to go with their mother. The evidence of the son can be accepted, as he is accepted to be the eye-witness. Hence, this Court is not inclined to disbelieve the evidence of Pranav.
22.Misunderstandings are part and parcel of marital life. If there is no difference of opinion between the husband and wife, then it is certainly a news. Though, in the case on hand, the respondent/husband has stated that his refusal to lend money to the parents of the appellant/wife frustrated her to commit suicide on 06.11.2005, the same ought not have been accepted by the Court below. From the pleadings, it is seen that after the alleged incident, the respondent/husband had taken care of the appellant/wife for nearly two years and thereafter, on account of his leaving to Rajasthan, since there was no one to look after her, the appellant/wife had to move to her mother's house, which cannot be termed as desertion. If really there was a difference of opinion between the appellant and the respondent and there was an attempt to suicide by the appellant, the respondent would have given such information to the police and there is no reason for him to take care of her for more than two years. It may be true that the wife has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights immediately, probably believing that the husband may join her. The very fact that he had appointed a servant-maid to take care of her shows his humanitarian attitude. Even assuming for the sake of argument that in order to avoid a police case, he has not disclosed that the appellant/wife has attempted to commit suicide, no prudent man will remain quiet, if it was a second attempt. There is no proof of repeated attempts of suicide as alleged.
23 Further, the observation of the Court below that the appellant/wife has not examined her father as a witness to rebut the contention of the respondent/husband with regard to lending of money, is not acceptable, as there is no proof to establish that money was lent in huge proportion and frequently.
24.The finding of the Family Court that there was a suicide attempt on 06.11.2005 and that the suicide attempt of the wife cannot be termed as an ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life and that divorce has got to be granted on the ground of cruelty and merely because, a complaint has not been filed under Section 306 IPC does not mean that the offence under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is wiped out, cannot be accepted, as the respondent/husband has not established his case properly with sufficient evidence. The evidence of the children, more particularly the evidence of their son, Pranav is very clear that the injuries suffered by his mother on 06.11.2005 is only due to an accidental fall. The finding that the wife jumped from the balcony in an attempt to commit suicide cannot be accepted. At best, it can be said that it was a fall. The respondent/husband has failed to establish his case. The conclusion of the court below on the basis of the available evidence is erroneous. The petition for restitution of conjugal rights after four years from the date of filing of the divorce petition is no ground to hold it against her for desertion.
25.Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/husband has mainly put forth his arguments on 'cruelty' and 'irretrievable breakdown of marriage' and has relied on decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and High Courts, to that effect. The allegation of the respondent/husband is that the appellant/wife has caused mental cruelty to him. Mental cruelty is the conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for the party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. The only judgment which may appear to support the case of the respondent/husband is the one rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple @ Kajal, (2011) 12 SCC 1, wherein, the wife had caused mental cruelty to the husband by often threatening him that she will commit suicide. That is a case, where mental cruelty alleged against the wife had been proved. But, in the case on hand, though it is strongly alleged that the appellant/wife had caused mental cruelty to the respondent/husband by often threatening him that she will commit suicide if he does not accede to her requests. Such an allegation has not been proved by the respondent/husband.
26 At this juncture, it is worth referring to the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533, which is reiterated hereunder:
9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.
27.Thus, in view of the above observation made by the Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao's case, the decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/husband in Pankaj Mahajan's case will not be applicable to the case on hand. The inference drawn by this Court that the injuries sustained by the appellant/wife is certainly an accidental fall, would go to show that there is no room for cruelty in this case. If the appellant/wife's attempt to commit suicide on 06.11.2005 is not first of its kind, the respondent/husband ought to have let in evidence to corroborate such incident of attempt to suicide. Failure on his part to do so shows that there is no 'mental cruelty' by the appellant/wife as alleged by the respondent/husband. Hence, the ground of 'cruelty' on which the Court below has answered in favour of the respondent/husband is erroneous and based on no evidence.
28.Coming to the point raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/husband that there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the same cannot be invoked in this case, as one of the parties, viz. the appellant/wife is interested in living with the respondent/husband, which is quite evident from the fact that she did not even think of filing a petition claiming monthly maintenance from her husband. That apart, irretrievable breakdown of marriage has not been incorporated as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
29.To save the marriage, several mediations were conducted by this Court between the appellant and the respondent. But, compromise could not be arrived at. In fact, even one of us (S.Vaidyanathan,J.) was a party to the mediation while sitting in a Division Bench with Justice S.Rajeswaran. This Court persuaded the children to go and stay with the mother and the same was accepted. In this case, after two years of mediation, the children, having grown up, are obsessed only with the father and they are not willing to go with the mother. Probably, keeping such distance from their mother must be due to the physical inability of the mother, as she is not in a position to look after them. Hence, this Court is left with no other option, but to come to a conclusion that the respondent/husband after taking care of the appellant/wife for two years and thinking that she might not recover, decided to get rid of her by filing a divorce petition.
30.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that there is no element of cruelty established against the appellant/wife and the marriage cannot be said to be irretrievable broken, as the appellant/wife is very much willing to live with the respondent/husband. Therefore, this Court allows these appeals. The decree for dissolution of marriage and dismissal of the plea for restitution of conjugal rights passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai vide judgment dated 25.11.2011 made in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011 are set aside. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.   (R.S.,J  (S.V.N.,J)
Internet:   Yes/No  06.04.2016
aeb
To :
The Principal Judge,
Family Court, Chennai.

Wednesday, June 13, 2018

When foreign Court divorce decree is valid/recognized/ Enforceable in India .



When foreign Court divorce decree is valid/recognized/ Enforceable  in India .

Foreign court decree of divorce or dissolution of marriage can be valid in India provided such decree is according to the provision of law in India as provided under section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code and Principle of law as laid down by the Indian courts. A foreign court divorce decree may be valid in India ONLY if the spouse had lived in that country and had consented to that country's jurisdiction.

FAQ on foreign divorce decree ?

1.       Question : My husband or wife has filed divorce petition in USA/UK/Australia  Court for dissolution of marriage on grounds of “Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage “ is this decree is valid in India ?

Ans. This means the couple can no longer live together as husband  and wife. Both partners, and one partner, must prove to the court that the marriage broke down so badly that there is no  chances of reconciliation or possible for staying together , but this ground is not available under Hindu Marriage Act in India and thus if marriage dissolved on this grounds is not valid or enforceable in India..

2.       My wife or Husband has filed a divorce petition in USA/ or in abroad , he or she has received the court summons and  after receiving the same relocate in India but court has passed the decree of divorce in his or her absence , Is Ex parte divorce is valid or recognized in India ?.

Ans : when an ex-parte decree is passed by a Foreign Court, it would not be valid and conclusive in India. divorce obtained on grounds other than the grounds enumerated under the Hindu Marriage Act if the parties were married under Hindu Law, as a divorce matter is governed by the law under which one gets married and not the law of the land where the party is residing.

3.     When foreign court divorce decree will be valid or recognized or enforceable in India ?

Ans : It is a general rule that if one of the partners/ couple/party  contests divorce filed in Foreign Court  it would be said that he/she consented/ accepted  to the jurisdiction of that Court, in such a case the decree would be considered to be a conclusive or valid  one.
Where the wife consents to the grant of the relief by the foreign Court although the jurisdiction of the foreign Court is not in accordance with the provisions of the Matrimonial Law/ Private and Personal or International Laws  of the parties, to be valid and the judgment of such foreign Court to be conclusive.

4.     How can I validate/ Enforce or Execute my foreign divorce decree in India ?

Ans: A foreign judgment can be executed in two ways in India. The ways are as follows:

First, by filing an execution under Section 44A of the Civil Procedure Code. Section  44A states that a decree passed by Courts in reciprocating territories can be executed in India as if the decree was passed by the Indian Courts only. The Court also see the judgments  passed by foreign court as per sec.13 of Civil Procedure Code .
Secondly, by filing a civil  suit upon the foreign judgment/decree. For instance, the decree does not pertain to a reciprocating territory or a superior Court of a reciprocating territory, as notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the decree is not directly executable in India.

Thursday, January 25, 2018

whether presence of couple or parties staying abroad are required to appear in court in mutual divorce

“Where the parties are living far away from the jurisdiction of the Court competent to dissolve the marriage, the parties after filing their affidavits can appoint attorneys to act on their behalf. Attorney is competent to act on behalf of the principal on the basis of power of attorney executed by the principal. The Courts have been allowing attorneys to file the petition, to withdraw the petition, to carry on proceedings in the Court on behalf of their principal in all other cases. The attorney can also act in matrimonial cases as per instructions of their principle. The Court can take necessary precautions to prevent frauds being perpetuated on it but unless the Court smells some kind of fraud being played with it, the Court should normally recognize the act of the attorneys. “
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IN COURT OF THE HIGH DELHI AT NEW DELHI

SUBJECT : Divorce Act

 Date of Reserve: September 05, 2008

Date of Order: September 19, 2008

CM(M) 1030/2008

 Mr. Vinay Jude Dias ... Petitioner Through: Mr. Sandeep Sethi with Mr. Anshu Mahajan and Mr. Vikas Aggarwal, Advs.

Versus

 Ms. Renajeet Kaur ... Respondent

Through:

JUDGMENT:

1. The petitioner is aggrieved by an order of learned ADJ dated 25th August, 2008 whereby in a Divorce Petition by mutual consent filed by the petitioners, the Court directed personal appearance of both the parties for purpose of its satisfaction regarding an inquiry under Section 10(A) of the Divorce Act.

2. Notice of the petition was accepted by the respondent in the Court and respondent supported the petition and wanted the petition to be allowed. Thus, the Court has only to examine whether the personal appearance of the petitioner before the Court below was necessary in order to obtain divorce with mutual consent under Section 10(A) of Divorce Act.

 3. In the present case, the special power of attorney in favour of one Mr. Lal Babu Tiwari was executed by the petitioner (husband) to appear before the Court and testify about the contents of the petition. The petitioner has signed the petition before Indian consulate High Commission of India in UK under Section 3(2) of the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1947 under which the documents do not require any further evidence.

4. The learned ADJ relying on Janaki Vasudeo Bhojwani Vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 439 wherein Supreme Court had held that a general power of attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of the party but he cannot become witness on behalf of party. He can only appear in his own capacity. No one can delegate the power to appear in witness box on behalf of himself, considered that the attorney cannot depose in the Court to satisfy the inquiry as required under Section 10(A) of Divorce Act.

 5. There can be no dispute that the attorney of the petitioner can appear in the Court on behalf of the party and do the act as specified in power of attorney. An attorney is not an incompetent witness. He can appear in the Court and depose in the Court as a witness in respect of facts which are in his knowledge. He cannot depose in respect of the facts which are not in his knowledge and knowledge of which has been derived by him from principal without witnessing the facts himself. However, if an attorney has witnessed all those facts himself which were also witnessed by the principal, an attorney cannot be told that he cannot appear in the witness box and depose in the Court in respect of the facts known to him. Facts which are within the special knowledge of principal and are not in the knowledge of attorney can only be deposed by the principal. Whether the parties were married on a particular day, is not a private act of the parties. Marriage is normally a public act in this country and evidence can be given by anyone who has knowledge of the fact. Whether the parties are living separate or not is also known to other people associated with the parties and is not something secret. Similarly, for how long parties were living separate can be deposed in the Court by any person who is aware of the facts. If an attorney aware of these facts and can answer the questions of the Court, the attorney cannot be told that he is not a competent witness or his statement would not be recorded. Similarly an attorney, on the basis of instructions/directions given to him, can answer the queries, if there was any possibility of parties patching up and living together or the marriage has broken down irretrievably. An attorney has to be allowed to appear in the witness box and make statement. The Court may reject that part of his statement which is based on hearsay or which he has no personal knowledge. But he cannot be prevented from appearing in the witness box and deposing and answering the queries. Same is the import of judgment of Supreme Court in Janaki Vasudeo Bhojwani (supra) wherein Supreme Court had not debarred an attorney from appearing in the witness box but the Supreme Court has stated the facts which are only in the knowledge of the principal, about those facts attorney cannot testify in the Court.

 6. This Court in Neelima Chopra vs. Anil Chopra 1986 (11) DRJ 188 held that if both the parties, by way of affidavits or through counsel, state that they are married, and are able to produce proof of the marriage and that they have been living separately and have not been able to live together for the prescribed period, then there can be no reason as to why the Court should not record its satisfaction as envisaged under Section 13-B(2) of Hindu Marriage Act, despite the fact that parties had not appeared in person and pass a decree for divorce.

7. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Annalie Prashad vs. Romesh Prashad AIR 1968 Calcutta 48 had made following observations : 3. In our opinion, neither of the above two reasons can be sustained in law. The Special Marriage Act by Section 40 attracts the Code of Civil Procedure subject, of course, to the other provisions of the said statute and to such rules as the High Court may make in that behalf. The learned trial Judge does not say that there is anything in the statute or in the rules, which would conflict with the view that affidavit evidence would be permissible, unless we agree with him that the Act, having prescribed that the parties should be heard, would necessarily require their personal appearance or presence before the Court. We do not, however, think that that is the consequence of the words ``hearing the parties'` and, accordingly, the reason given by the learned trial Judge in that behalf cannot be accepted We are also unable to agree that, in a case of divorce by mutual consent, affidavit evidence should be excluded on the ground that in such a case, it is desirable that the parties themselves should be present in Court. In the premises, Order 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted by the above special statute as part of the Code and would not be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication.

 8. Where the parties are living far away from the jurisdiction of the Court competent to dissolve the marriage, the parties after filing their affidavits can appoint attorneys to act on their behalf. Attorney is competent to act on behalf of the principal on the basis of power of attorney executed by the principal. The Courts have been allowing attorneys to file the petition, to withdraw the petition, to carry on proceedings in the Court on behalf of their principal in all other cases. The attorney can also act in matrimonial cases as per instructions of their principle. The Court can take necessary precautions to prevent frauds being perpetuated on it but unless the Court smells some kind of fraud being played with it, the Court should normally recognize the act of the attorneys.

9. I therefore allow this petition. The order of the Trial Court insisting on the personal appearance of the parties is set aside. The attorneys are permitted to make statement before the Court below.

 Sd./- September 19, 2008

 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J.

Wednesday, January 24, 2018

Divorce granted to husband on Grounds of cruelty, Desertion and False criminal Cases and Adultery.

Divorce  granted to husband on Grounds of cruelty, Desertion and False criminal Cases and Adultery.

“The contention of the husband was that the appellant was in the habit of quarrelling with him on petty issues without any cause and reason and had even refused to prepare food for him and do the household chores. She also humiliated him in the presence of his friends on several occasions by refusing to serve them tea. The appellant never wanted to stay with him or his parents at the village and always used to force him to drop her at her parental home; she did not have any love and affection for him and his parents; that the appellant had also pressurised him to leave the job and settle down in Delhi; he bought a land in Burari and constructed two storey house from his savings but the appellant preferred staying in her parental home at Gulabi Bagh, Delhi and used to come to their newly constructed house once a week. The husband had all along supported the appellant and their children financially as well as morally. When the construction of the house was completed, the appellant had refused to live with him at the place of his posting. She also forced her mother-in-law to leave the house who thereafter started living in her native village. She used to say that "yeh log hamare status kay neie hain."

On these facts, the respondent/husband had alleged that he had suffered severe mental agony, tension, harassment and distress and that the behaviour of the appellant had caused him great anguish and amounted to cruelty. He had alleged that the appellant had also deserted him since she had refused to live with him. He had also averred that they had been living separately since March 2006 and it was not possible for him to continue living with her since there was a danger to his life and limb.
The first contention of the appellant is that the learned Family Court has given undue weightage to the evidence of the respondent and has discarded the evidence of the appellant. However, this contention has no merit. On the contrary, the evidence on record (including that of the appellant) was duly considered and distinguished and elaborately discussed in the impugned judgment and only thereafter the conclusion was drawn. Record shows that the appellant had examined herself alone in support of her pleas but here is no corroboration to her testimony. Several contradictions in her testimony have been discussed in the impugned judgment. Even otherwise, the burden to prove that the respondent/husband was subjected to cruelty by the appellant, was upon him and it was for him to discharge the same by leading cogent evidence.

 The settled proposition of law in civil proceedings is that the principle of proof of a fact is established on a preponderance of possibility and the respondent/husband is not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidences on record points out to the existence of  a particular fact, then the said fact can be accepted as having been proved. We may note that the expression "cruelty" has not been defined under the HMA. Cruelty can be mental or physical. It is easy for a party to prove physical cruelty, but mental cruelty depends on various factors.

. In the case of G.V.N. Kameswara Rao vs. G. Jabilli reported at (2002) 2 SSC 296, the Supreme Court had observed that false police complaints would result in mental cruelty as it leads to loss of reputation and standing in the society at the instance of one's spouse. The act of leveling of unsubstantiated charges of adultery against the husband not only during the stay of the spouses together, but also during the divorce proceedings was treated as an act of cruelty on the part of the wife.

 In R. Balasubramanian vs. Vijaylakshmi Balsubramanian (SMT) reported at (1999) 7 SCC 311, the Supreme Court held that an
unfounded allegation of adultery is a serious allegation amounting to cruel conduct, and found that these factors cumulatively proved cruelty on the part of the appellant therein for entitling the husband to dissolution of the marriage.

 In the case titled Santosh Sahay vs. Hanuman Sahay reported as 2016 IX AD (Delhi) 1, a Division Bench of this Court has held that false character assassination and allegations of such a nature made by a spouse amounts to mental cruelty and the wronged spouse is entitled to seek divorce on that ground.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI                                  
+      MAT.APP.(F.C.) 95/2017, CM No. 19921/2017, CM No. 19923/2017

       SANTOSH                                                                                        ..... Appellant
                                                                                                     Through:    Mr. Gaurav Choudhary, Advocate
                                                                                                                         along with Mr. Jaswinder Singh,
                                                                                                                          Advocate along with appellant in
                                                                                                                           person.
                          versus

       HORI LAL                                                                                                     ..... Respondent
                                                                                                                              Through:    None.
       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
       HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE DEEPA SHARMA
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE DEEPA SHARMA
1. Vide the present appeal, the appellant has challenged the order dated 31.03.2017 passed by Principal Judge (Family Court), Tis Hazari, Delhi whereby her marriage with the respondent was dissolved under Section 13 (1) (ia) & (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "HMA").
2. As per the admitted facts, the marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized in Delhi on 29.06.1993, according to the Hindu  rites and ceremonies. The marriage was consummated and two children, one female and one male child were born from out of this wedlock. The respondent has been working with the Border Road Organization and at all times, has remained posted at different border areas of the country.
3. The petition for divorce was filed by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as "respondent/husband"). The case of the husband was that the marriage was very simple and after the marriage, he took the appellant to the matrimonial home at Village Bhopal Garhi Post Kurhar Distt, Etah, UP and stayed there for about 40 days. When he left for his duty, he left the appellant at her parental home on her request. After some time, the appellant joined him at his place of posting at Arunachal Pradesh where they stayed happily. She became pregnant and insisted upon the respondent/husband that she will deliver the first child at her parental home at Delhi and so, he brought her to Delhi and left her at her parental home. A female child was born on 29.03.1994. After about two months i.e. in May 1994, he took the appellant to his place of posting i.e. Arunachal Pradesh along with the minor daughter. The second child was born on 04.05.2002.
4. The contention of the husband was that the appellant was in the habit of quarrelling with him on petty issues without any cause and reason and had even refused to prepare food for him and do the household chores. She also humiliated him in the presence of his friends on several occasions by refusing to serve them tea. The appellant never wanted to stay with him or his parents at the village and always used to force him to drop her at her parental home; she did not have any love and affection for him and his parents; that the appellant had also pressurised him to leave the job and settle down in Delhi; he bought a land in Burari and constructed two storey house from his savings but the appellant preferred staying in her parental home at Gulabi Bagh, Delhi and used to come to their newly constructed house once a week. The husband had all along supported the appellant and their children financially as well as morally. When the construction of the house was completed, the appellant had refused to live with him at the place of his posting. She also forced her mother-in-law to leave the house who thereafter started living in her native village. She used to say that "yeh log hamare status kay neie hain."
5. The husband had referred to the incidents that took place in February 2006, which ultimately culminated in their separation. He alleged that on MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 3 26.02.2006, he had informed the appellant, on telephone, at around 8 p.m. that his father was unwell and that he was taking leave to visit him and asked her to accompany him to the village. However, once he reached Delhi, the appellant refused to accompany him to the village. She also refused to join him at his place of posting along with the children. She and her parents beat him on his visit to her parental home. He visited his house at Burari on 04.03.2006 where the appellant and her parents quarrelled with him and registered a false case against him under Section 107/150 of CrPC. He left for his village on 05.03.2006 and returned to Delhi on 07.03.2006 and went to his house at Burari and found that the appellant had removed all the household goods and had filed a false complaint under Section 498A/406/34 of IPC before Crime against Women Cell after 13 years of their marriage, alleging inter alia that he had demanded dowry of Rs. 35.00 lakhs. The respondent/husband was arrested in the FIR No. 61/2006 on 04.04.2006 and remained in judicial custody for about 20 days. With the help of police, the appellant removed the remaining articles from his house at Burari. She also removed all the jewellery lying in the locker at State Bank of India, Pratap Nagar, Delhi on 06.03.2006. She also filed several civil and criminal cases against him and his relatives on false and frivolous MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 4 grounds, just to harass and torture the husband. The appellant did all this with the intention of extracting more money from him and his relatives. Details in this respect have been furnished by the husband in para No. 15 of his petition. It was also averred that she had filed various complaints against the husband in different departments and authorities, which on investigation, were found to be false and baseless and that she had been making defamatory complaints against him and his family members.

6. On these facts, the respondent/husband had alleged that he had suffered severe mental agony, tension, harassment and distress and that the behaviour of the appellant had caused him great anguish and amounted to cruelty. He had alleged that the appellant had also deserted him since she had refused to live with him. He had also averred that they had been living separately since March 2006 and it was not possible for him to continue living with her since there was a danger to his life and limb.
7. The suit was contested by the appellant who filed her written statement wherein she had denied all the averments in the plaint, being false. She had further averred that she was forced to withdraw the FIR and other proceedings filed by her under compelling circumstances and since she did not want to take divorce from the husband, she did not file any suit MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 5 for divorce and that the respondent was taking undue advantage of his own wrong doings and that of his parents, sisters and brother-in-law. Her contention was that it was she, who had been treated with utmost cruelty by the husband and his family members. Her husband failed to maintain her and their two children and they were at the mercy of her father for day-to- day necessities and their school fees was also paid by her father. As per her version, their marriage was solemnised with great pomp and show and her parents had spent lakhs of rupees on their marriage and dowry articles, gifts and cash was given in the marriage which did not satisfy the husband and his family members who kept on raising demands and started harassing and treating her with cruelty, forcing her to fulfil their demands for brining additional dowry and cash amounts.
8. The appellant claimed that the respondent/husband demanded a Santro car on 28.02.2006 which her parents failed to provide. This refusal enraged the husband. He and his brother asked her to sign on certain blank papers and on her refusal to do so, and in view of the inability of her parents to provide a new Santro car, the respondent/husband got so infuriated that he did not allow her to enter the house. She was beaten by him and his other relatives and sustained injuries. She admitted that she MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 6 had filed a complaint under Section 107/150 of the CrPC against him and his family members on 04.03.2006. It was also contended that she was forced to live in Delhi with her parents because husband refused to keep her at the place of his posting for the reason best known to him.
9. It was further averred by the appellant that she had been fulfilling all the obligations as a devoted wife and had always remained faithful to the respondent; she was always ready and willing to accompany the respondent/husband to his native village to look after her ailing father-in- law but he had refused to take her along with him to the village. On 04.03.2006 when she was beaten up, she had been medically examined. It was contended that it was her father who had purchased plot no. 55, Block A, Gali No. 8/1, Kaushik Enclave Swaroop Nagar Road, Burari, Delhi measuring 100 square yards in her name and constructed double storeyed house over it; that the husband had fraudulently procured her signatures on a General Power of Attorney executed in his favour and sold the house first to his brother, Sh. Bhopal Singh on 08.03.2006 and thereafter, to Mr. Satish Sisodia for a sum of Rs. 6,25,000/- and mis-appropriated the sale proceeds. The appellant urged that the respondent/husband could not be allowed to MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 7 take advantage of his own wrong and thus, was not entitled for a decree of divorce.

10. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, on 26.08.2009, the learned Trial Court had framed the following issues:-
"(1) Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty? (OPP)
 (2) Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a period of more than two years before the filing of the present petition? (OPP)
(3) Relief."
11. Both the parties had led their evidence. The respondent/husband had examined five witnesses in support of his case. In his statement, the petitioner/husband proved on record, the complaints filed by the appellant against him and marked as A to E. He also summoned a witness from the bank to prove that locker bearing no. 192 in the joint name of the parties was lastly operated by the appellant on 06.03.2006. The said record was exhibited by the witness as Ex.PW 2/1 to Ex. PW 2/5. The appellant, however, examined herself alone in support of her case. After hearing the parties at length and considering the evidences on record, the learned Trial Court reached the conclusion that the appellant had treated the respondent with cruelty and that she had deserted him without any just cause and resultantly, dissolved their marriage. Hence the present appeal.
12. The appellant has challenged the impugned order on the grounds that the learned Family Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and did not take into consideration the torture and the harassment she was subjected to; that reliance on the evidence of the respondent and rejection of the testimony of the appellant is unfounded; that the learned Family Court failed to consider the contradictions in the testimony of the respondent and the fact that the husband has not been able to produce any corroborative evidence to prove the allegations levelled by him against the appellant; that the Family Court failed to take into account the fact that it was the respondent who had treated the appellant with cruelty and, therefore, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong in view of the provisions of Section 23 of HMA. It was also contended by Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Family Court has wrongly granted divorce on the ground that the marriage between them has broken down because no such ground is available for divorce under the HMA. It is therefore prayed that the impugned judgment being illegal, perverse and contrary to law, is liable to be set aside.
13. We have heard the arguments addressed by learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the LCR which includes the pleadings and evidence of the parties.
14. The first contention of the appellant is that the learned Family Court has given undue weightage to the evidence of the respondent and has discarded the evidence of the appellant. However, this contention has no merit. On the contrary, the evidence on record (including that of the appellant) was duly considered and distinguished and elaborately discussed in the impugned judgment and only thereafter the conclusion was drawn. Record shows that the appellant had examined herself alone in support of her pleas but here is no corroboration to her testimony. Several contradictions in her testimony have been discussed in the impugned judgment. Even otherwise, the burden to prove that the respondent/husband was subjected to cruelty by the appellant, was upon him and it was for him to discharge the same by leading cogent evidence.
15. The settled proposition of law in civil proceedings is that the principle of proof of a fact is established on a preponderance of possibility and the respondent/husband is not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidences on record points out to the existence of MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 10 a particular fact, then the said fact can be accepted as having been proved. We may note that the expression "cruelty" has not been defined under the HMA. Cruelty can be mental or physical. It is easy for a party to prove physical cruelty, but mental cruelty depends on various factors.
16. In Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh reported at (2007) 4 SCC 511 while dealing with the concept of mental cruelty, the Apex Court has observed as under:
"99. The human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound; therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in the other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system.
100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system, etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances...."
17. Further, in Ravi Kumar vs. Julmidevi reported at (2010) 4 SCC 476, the Supreme Court held that cruelty is to be judged from the behavior, taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the case and observed that:-
"20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be of infinite variety--it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and words..."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Therefore, there is no mathematical formula to assess cruelty. If the consistent behaviour of a spouse is of such a nature as to causes pain, discomfort or it brings disrespect or disrepute to the other spouse, such behavior would constitute cruelty. Trust, mutual respect, understanding and commitment sustain a marriage. When two persons live together in matrimony, it is expected that they will be tolerant towards each other's attitude, behaviours, moods etc. and not be over sensitive towards innocent and natural behaviour/attitude or stray mood swings of the spouse.
Spouses are expected to be supportive of each others' needs and MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 12 requirements which includes extending due respect to the family members of the spouse.
19. While appreciating the evidence in such matters, in Deb Narayan Halder vs. Anushree Halder reported at (2003) 11 SCC 303, the Supreme Court held that Courts should rely on evidence, which is contemporaneous and observed as under:-
20.....In cases where there is a dispute between husband and wife it is very difficult to unravel the true reason for the dispute. After separation when the relationship turns sour, all sorts of allegations and counter allegations are made against each other. Evidence of contemporaneous nature therefore plays an important role in such cases as it may reveal the thinking and attitude of the parties towards each other at the relevant time. Such evidence is usually found in the form of letters written by the parties to each other or to their friends and relatives or recorded in any other document of contemporaneous nature. If really the respondent was subjected to cruelty and harassment in the manner alleged by her, we have no doubt she would have written about such treatment to her friends and relatives with whom she may have corresponded..."
(emphasis supplied)
20. The evidence brought on record clearly reveals that the parties got married on 29.06.1993 and from the period from 1993 to 2001, the appellant had been staying with the husband at the place of his posting and she was visiting her parents in Delhi during this period. The husband was employed in the Border Road Organization and was posted to different MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 13 places outside Delhi including Arunachal Pradesh. The appellant had stayed with him at those places but she had not written any letter even to her parents, complaining about the misbehaviour of the respondent. There appears no dispute between them during their entire stay at the places of posting, as no complaint of any nature had been filed by the appellant before any authority in this regard. It is also evident that the appellant did not produce any document which could suggest that she had any complaint of any nature against the respondent during her stay with him.
21. During this entire period, till the filing of the complaint of demand of dowry under Section 498 A IPC, no complaint of any nature has been placed on record by the appellant against the respondent. The evidence also shows that the appellant started living in the Burari house since the year 2001 and during this period, the respondent had been visiting her in that house. The appellant has also failed to prove that it was her father who purchased the property in her name. No document has been produced on record by the appellant to prove that she was the registered owner of the property and it was sold by the respondent by fraudulently obtaining her signatures on a Power of Attorney. No document was also produced on record to prove that the construction undertaken over the plot was raised by MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 14 her father. During the existence of a marriage of about 13 years, no complaint of demand of dowry was ever lodged by the appellant against the respondent or his family members.

22. Apparently, the dispute between the parties arose sometime in March 2006. The appellant has not disputed that in March 2006, the respondent wanted to visit his ailing father at the village and he did visit him. While respondent/husband contends that it was the appellant who had refused to accompany him, the appellant took the plea that he did not take her along, which she had failed to substantiate by leading any evidence. The appellant has not produced any substantive evidence in support of her contention that she had been visiting her in-laws in the village. On the contrary, the evidence on record clearly shows that whenever she was in Delhi, she used to reside with her parents. Although she has contended that the respondent was not providing her money towards her maintenance and that of their children and it was her father who was bearing all the expenses during her stay in the Burari house, she has not produced any evidence to prove that the school fees of the children was being paid by her father. In fact, she has failed to examine her father. It is also a fact that the appellant never made any complaint to anyone including the respondent's department MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 15 to the effect that he was not giving them any money for their subsistence, nor had she filed any case claiming maintenance from him. There is no contemporaneous evidence on record which can even remotely suggest that the respondent had demanded dowry and that he and his family members had beaten the appellant or that he was not taking care of her and children and was not providing financial support to them.
23. The other plea of the appellant is that her husband and his family members used to demand dowry and harass her and had demanded a Santro car on 04.06.2006 and, on refusal, beaten her and turned her out of the house, thus compelling her to file a complaint under Section 498A. It turns out that the husband was discharged in the said case under Section 498A IPC, which only goes to show that there was no substance in the allegations made by the appellant in her complaint under Section 498A IPC. She has also contended that the respondent had forced her to abort their child against her wishes, but has failed to produce any evidence on record to prove the said allegations. During the cross-examination of Sh. Bhopal Singh (PW-4), the respondent's witness, a suggestion was made that the respondent had got married to another women but it remained a mere suggestion, without any proof. The appellant has also admitted in her MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 16 testimony that the respondent had visited her at her parental home at Gulabi Bagh, Delhi on 28.02.2006 and that after 28.02.2006, she had never visited Etah, UP, where her in-laws reside.
24. On the other hand, the respondent has produced on record the evidence to demonstrate that the appellant had removed all the items lying in the locker held in their joint names, without obtaining his consent. The witness from the Bank, PW-2 had duly proved the fact that the locker was operated lastly by the appellant on 06.03.2006. This fact clearly shows that after the alleged incident of 04.03.2006, the appellant had taken out all the articles lying in the locker without the consent of her husband. The respondent has also examined PW-3 who brought the records from the Border Roads Organisation which proves the fact appellant had filed that several complaints making various allegations against the respondent not only in his office, but also to several other authorities with a copy marked to his office. Enquires were made into the allegations in the complaints, but no substance was found therein and ultimately, the respondent was exonerated. The husband had taken a plea that this act of the wife had caused him grave distress, agony and had also lowered his reputation in the department, among his friends and colleagues and in the society.
25. In the case of G.V.N. Kameswara Rao vs. G. Jabilli reported at (2002) 2 SSC 296, the Supreme Court had observed that false police complaints would result in mental cruelty as it leads to loss of reputation and standing in the society at the instance of one's spouse. The act of leveling of unsubstantiated charges of adultery against the husband not only during the stay of the spouses together, but also during the divorce proceedings was treated as an act of cruelty on the part of the wife. In R. Balasubramanian vs. Vijaylakshmi Balsubramanian (SMT) reported at (1999) 7 SCC 311, the Supreme Court held that an unfounded allegation of adultery is a serious allegation amounting to cruel conduct, and found that these factors cumulatively proved cruelty on the part of the appellant therein for entitling the husband to dissolution of the marriage.
26. In the present case, the evidence clearly establishes the facts that the appellant had filed a false criminal complaint under Section 498 A of IPC, and Court had discharged the respondent. On her complaints, the department had also conducted enquiry against the respondent and thereafter, exonerated him, finding no truth in such complaints. Further, during the trial, the appellant had taken a stand that her husband had got remarried to another woman by giving an suggestion of this nature to PW-4, but could not prove it.
27. In the case of Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate vs. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate reported as (2003) 6 SCC 334, the Supreme Court has settled the proposition of law by observing as under:-
"7. The question that requires to be answered first is as to whether the averments, accusations and character assassination of the wife by the appellant husband in the written statement constitutes mental cruelty for sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Act. The position of law in this regard has come to be well settled and declared that disgusting levelling accusations of unchastity and indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and allegations of extramarital relationship is a grave assault on the character, honour, reputation, status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions of perfidiousness attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of an educated Indian wife and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount to worst form of insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate cruelty in law, warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such allegations made in the written statement or suggested in the course of examination and by way of cross- examination satisfy the requirement of law has also come to be firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the relevant portions of such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken to the findings recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court.
We find that they are of such quality, magnitude and consequence as to cause mental pain, agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated concept of cruelty in matrimonial law causing profound and lasting disruption and driving the wife to feel deeply hurt and reasonably apprehend that it would be dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting her MAT.APP.(F.C) 95/2017 Page 19 like that and rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible." (emphasis added)
28. Again, in a recent decision in the case of Narendra vs. K. Meena reported as AIR 2016 SC 4599, applying the ratio of its earlier decision in the case of Vijaykumar (supra) the Supreme Court has reiterated that unsubstantiated allegations if levelled, amounts to mental cruelty and is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. In a very recent judgment in the case of Raj Talreja vs. Kavita Talreja reported as AIR 2017 SC 2138, relying on the ratio of an earlier decision in the case of Ravi Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court has held that "reckless, defamatory and false accusations against her husband, his family members and colleagues, which would definitely have the effect of lowering his reputation in the eyes of peers" amounting to cruelty. In the case titled Santosh Sahay vs. Hanuman Sahay reported as 2016 IX AD (Delhi) 1, a Division Bench of this Court has held that false character assassination and allegations of such a nature made by a spouse amounts to mental cruelty and the wronged spouse is entitled to seek divorce on that ground.
29. To sum up, the allegations leveled by the appellant which she failed to substantiate even on the yardstick of preponderance of evidence, are of such a nature that would have lowered the image of the respondent in the  eyes of his superiors, subordinates and peers and this act would certainly constitute cruelty. It is an undisputed position that the parties have been living separately since 04.03.2006 and in all this duration, the appellant seems to have made no effort to join the company of the respondent. Rather, her act of 06.03.2006 of cleaning out the joint locker of the parties shows an animus descendi.
30. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the findings of the learned Trial Court are based on the evidence on record. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Family Court had given more weightage to the evidence of the respondent is turned down as baseless. We find no reason to unsettle the impugned judgment which is accordingly upheld. As a result, the appeal is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.


DEEPA SHARMA (JUDGE) HIMA KOHLI (JUDGE)

Tuesday, January 9, 2018

Adultery Ground for Divorce in India under Hindu Marriage Act.

What  is Adultery and  when can it be proved in Court ?

Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offense of rape, is guilty of the offense of adultery.
According to Hinduism dictionary,” Adultery is sexual intercourse between a married man and a woman not his wife, or between a married woman and a man not her husband.”
adultery is, as a general rule, proved by presumptive proof based upon;
(a) circumstantial evidence;
(b) evidence of non-access and the birth of children;
(c) contracting venereal diseases;
(d) by evidence of visits to house of ill-repute;
(e) decrees and admissions made in previous proceedings; and
(f) confessions and admissions of the parties which should be generally corroborated though in exceptional circumstances, even if uncorroborated may be acted upon.
Therefore, it is important to understand that mere bald allegations by a spouse that his/her partner was having adulterous relationship with his/her lover after marriage, in absence of any cogent evidence, would not be sufficient to prove.

What is the Punishment in Indian Penal Code ?

In India the offence of adultery is punishable under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. As it stands, this Section makes only men having sexual intercourse with the wives of other men without the consent of their husbands punishable and women cannot be punished even as abettors.
Section-497- Adultery “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case, the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.

What is the Legal Position when  refusal to have sexual intercourse by Partner ?

Whether refusal to have sexual intercourse amounts to cruelty or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Sexual intercourse is just one of marital rights. No doubt, the denial of sexual relations causes frustration and misery to the aggrieved party and is likely to destroy the fibre of marriage yet reasonable denial on the part of either party does not constitute cruelty. This aspect of marital obligation has been dealt with in most elaborate manner in Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 130 Ny.S.II D 762. It is observed that this obligation is of a personal and delicate nature and depends on sentiments and feelings to such an extent that it would be an intrusion into the privacy of domestic life to stipulate reasonable denial on the part of either party to submit to marital intercourse constitutes cruelty. Such denial does not constitute cruelty even though refusal to have marital sexual relations undermines the essential structure of a marriage.

What  is the definition of adultery  in Divorce Laws:

According to divorce laws, adultery is voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's wife or husband. Rayden defines it as "Consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex not the other spouse, during the subsistence of marriage. It is no more necessary that a person should continue living in adultery. Single act of intercourse constitutes adultery.


Thus the adultery is to be inferred from circumstances which must indicate inclination, guilty 
intention and opportunity to commit adultery. Bed room evidence is one of such strong circumstances as way back in 1909 in Kerr v. Kerr, 114 App. Div. 1421, it was observed that where man and a woman who are not husband and wife have bed room privacy, there is strong inference of adultery as they do not sing prayers there.



Delhi High Court
Smt. Linda Constance Edwards vs Shri William Edwards & Anr
Equivalent citations: 2001 IIIAD Delhi 482, 91 (2001) DLT 355, I (2001) DMC 746, 2001 (58) DRJ 731
ORDER J.D. Kapoor, J.
1. Marriage between the parties who are Christians took place more than 25 years ago. Its dissolution has been sought on the ground of cruelty coupled with adultery.

2. It is alleged that right from day one respondent No.1, i.e. the husband started exhibiting symptoms of cruelty, apathy and lack of interest towards the petitioner and somehow or other the petitioner pulled on with the marriage till the year 1978 in the hope that the respondent No.1 may change. The impression of the petitioner was that the problems of his character may be due to temperament and not a basic trait of his character that may be incorrigible or unchangeable. That off and on the respondent No.1 used to come home fully drunk and indulged in physical beatings. However, when all efforts failed, the petitioner found that respondent No.1 was psychologically ill and has maniac traits right from his childhood and his character is unsuitable for a marital life and so much so the doctors, psychologists and priests have advised him not to entry into a marital life but the respondent No.1 played a fraud upon the petitioner and obtained her consent. In spite of the fact that two children were born to the petitioner during the three years of their joint stay the respondent No.1 developed hatred towards her and stopped having intercourse with her and rather spurned and rejected the advances and offers sometimes fiercely and sometimes in most hateful manner from 1978 to 1980. It is further alleged that during 1978-1980 respondent No.1 used to beat the petitioner almost daily and also used to remain absent from home continuously for 2-3 days without any reason or intimation.

3. On making inquires through friends and relatives the petitioner came to know that respondent No.1 was having illicit relationship with woman of bad character named Ms. Sonia residing in Paharganj area. When she objected to respondent No.1's conduct and absenteeism and cruel behavior towards the petitioner and his adulterous affairs he became violent and threw the petitioner and children out of matrimonial home. However, the repeated entreaties did not find favor and he refused to accept the petitioner and children back to matrimonial home. Being compelled by the circumstances she undertook a job for her survival as also for survival of the children.

4. Now for the last five years the respondent No.1 has been living with another woman Ms.Rubi Mehra, respondent No.2, and when petitioner requested him to leave respondent no. 2 and accept petitioner and children back he did not pay any heed and when she approached his mother, she also expressed her inability by saying that he was no more under her control.

5. Last attempt to reconcile and mend respondent No.1 was made by the petitioner on 28.9.1997. At about 2.30 afternoon she went to the house where respondent No.1 has been living with aforesaid Ms.Rubi Mehra and finding no response from the doorbell and knock at the door she tried to open the door and moment she pushed it, it got opened since no latch was put inside. When she went inside and did not find anybody in the drawing room, she proceeded to the bedroom and knocked at the door. The respondent No.1 removed the latch and half-opened the door but when she pushed it, respondent No.1 lost the control of his hold and the door got opened. She saw respondent No.2 lying in the bed stark naked. She pulled the bed sheet and covered herself. The only inference was that both of them were having sexual intercourse at that time. Respondent No.1 became very angry and hurt the petitioner on her face and pushed her out of the room and abused her by calling her a bitch and also threatened to kill her in case she again tried to enter the house. Thus, the respondent no.1 has not only committed physical and mental cruelty upon the petitioner but has also been committing adultery since long apart from deserting her and her children.

6. In spite of having been served with the notice of the petition, none of the respondents came forward to contest it. The petitioner filed the affidavit by way of evidence in support of aforesaid allegations.

7. As is apparent, there are allegations of physical beating, remaining absent for days from the matrimonial home without information or intimation and having adulterous affairs with two women and lastly having been found in suspicious and questionable circumstances with respondent no.2 in the bed room and the long desertion of the petitioner and the children and failure of all efforts on the part of the petitioner to bring back the respondent no.1 on the path of virtue or attend the husbandly duties.

8. It is no more valid to say the cruelty occurs only when there is bodily harm or infliction of physical blows endangering life, limb or health. The concept of cruelty in marital relations has widened its net and brought the mental cruelty into its fold. Since element of happiness in marriage has gained currency, the definition of cruelty cannot be put in strait-jacket manner. Marital cruelty which includes mental cruelty also has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in , V. Bhagat vs. Mrs. D.Bhagat. as under :-
"Mental cruelty in S.13(1)(ia) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner."

9. Thus it is not always essential that a course of conduct should aim at causing mental pain and suffering in order to constitute the cruelty. It is the effect produced by the course of conduct and acts of a spouse and not the motive that is relevant. It has been rightly said that sometimes words inflict a more painful blow and cause psychological sufferings and emotional distress than physical cruelty, though occasional bickerings or pinpricks are part of normal marital life as human fragility generates such skirmishes.

10. Whether refusal to have sexual intercourse amounts to cruelty or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Sexual intercourse is just one of marital rights. No doubt, the denial of sexual relations causes frustration and misery to the aggrieved party and is likely to destroy the fibre of marriage yet reasonable denial on the part of either party does not constitute cruelty. This aspect of marital obligation has been dealt with in most elaborate manner in Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 130 Ny.S.II D 762. It is observed that this obligation is of a personal and delicate nature and depends on sentiments and feelings to such an extent that it would be an intrusion into the privacy of domestic life to stipulate reasonable denial on the part of either party to submit to marital intercourse constitutes cruelty. Such denial does not constitute cruelty even though refusal to have marital sexual relations undermines the essential structure of a marriage.

11. It is further observed that, if refusal is occasional, or for a short period, it is against public policy to treat it as cruelty. However, complete failure to have sexual intercourse for a prolonged period or its total or irrevocable negation despite advances and requests does constitute cruelty as in the absence of an adequate excuse such refusal strikes at the basic obligations springing from marriage undermining its essential structure.

12. For instance a denial on the ground of ill health or say after child birth or for some such reasons including excessive or obsessive sexual demands of a spouse may fall in the category of reasonable denial.

13. Here for several years the petitioner has been denied the sexual relations despite her advances and requests even during the period both were living under the same roof. Such denial is total negation of one of the most important marital obligations and amounts to cruelty.

14. Though the statutory provisions of Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act all for proof of adultery also if the divorce is sought on the ground of cruelty but in view of the view taken by the Special Bench of Kerala High Court in , Ammini E.J. and etc. v. Union of India and others and the Full Bench of Maharashtra in , Mrs. Pragati Varghese and etc. vs. Cyril George Varghese and etc., it is no more necessary for a party seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty to prove adultery.

15. In Ammini's case (supra) the provisions of Section 10 were held to be violative of Article 21as well as 14 of the Constitution of India as they compel a deserted or cruelly treated Christian wife to live perpetually tied down to a marriage which has for all intents and purposes ceased to exist as a result of desertion and cruelty shown by the husband concerned are highly harsh and oppressive and as such arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Christian spouses alone are not entitled to get dissolution of their marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion even if perpetrated continuously for any length of time. They are entitled to get only a decree for judicial separation under Section 22 of the Act. Spouses belonging to all other religions governed by the other religions Acts are entitled to get dissolution of their marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion for the period fixed by the respective Acts. The provisions of Section 10 are held to be discriminatory vis-a-vis Christians spouses merely on the basis of religion.

16. In Pragati's case (supra) the Bombay High Court also held the provisions of Section 10 as violative of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India for the following reasons:
"The different treatment which is accorded to Christian woman under S.10 of the Act is based merely on grounds of sex. Similarly, if one compares the provisions of the other enactments on the subject of divorce, it would be clear that Christian wives are discriminated and have been treated differently as compared to wives who are governed by the other enactments. The discrimination is, therefore, based merely on grounds of religion. The aforesaid discrimination, in the circumstances, is violative both, of Art. 14 and of Art. 15 of the Constitution. Similarly, if one has regard to the dealing with protection of life and personal liberty, it would be clear that the position of Christian women, has been rendered most demeaning as compared to Christian husbands, as also wives governed by other enactments. The provisions contained in S.10 in the circumstances, are violative of Art.21 also."

17. This being the position of law the petitioner is even otherwise entitled to decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty though she has also proved successfully the ground of adultery.
18. According to divorce laws, adultery is voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's wife or husband. Rayden defines it as "Consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex not the other spouse, during the subsistence of marriage. It is no more necessary that a person should continue living in adultery. Single act of intercourse constitutes adultery.

19. Here when the petitioner wife came to know that the respondent No.1 has started living with respondent No.2 at premises C-125, Dayanand Colony, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi - 110024, she visited the premises and found the door closed. There was no response to the doorbell as well as the knock. She pushed open the door that led her to the drawing room. There was nobody. Feeling suspicious she knocked at the door of the bed room. The moment it was in the process of being opened, the petitioner pushed it open forcefully and found respondent No.2 lying stark naked in the bed. On seeing her, she pulled the bed sheet to cover her up.

20. It is said that the adultery is committed in darkness and secrecy and, therefore, it is difficult to provide a direct proof. Rather eyewitness account or photographic account of evidence of intercourse is taken as offending. A celebrated jurist Raydon in Raydon on Divorce observes that a direct evidence is rather apt to be disbelieved as it smacks of manipulation. It is rare that the parties are surprised in direct act of adultery. In the opinion of Sir William Scott in Lovedon vs. Lovedon, 2 Hagg Con, 1810, (Australian Family Law, p.455), "the only general rule that can be laid down upon the subject is that the circumstances must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion, for it is not to lead a harsh and intemperate judgment, moving upon appearances that are equally capable of two interpretations, neither is it to be a matter of artificial reasoning, judging upon such things differently from what would strike the careful and cautious consideration of a discreet man".
21. Thus the adultery is to be inferred from circumstances which must indicate inclination, guilty intention and opportunity to commit adultery. Bed room evidence is one of such strong circumstances as way back in 1909 in Kerr v. Kerr, 114 App. Div. 1421, it was observed that where man and a woman who are not husband and wife have bed room privacy, there is strong inference of adultery as they do not sing prayers there.

21. In the instant case sufficient bed room evidence has been furnished by the petitioner culminating in proof of adultery.
22. Taking over-all view and the long course of cruel conduct coupled not only with adulterous dispositions but actual indulgence in adultery, I feel pursuaded to allow the petition and grant decree for dissolution of marriage. Accordingly the marriage is dissolved. A decree sheet be prepared.