. The question that
requires to be answered first is as to
whether the
averments, accusations and
character assassination of
the wife by the
appellant husband in the written statement constitutes mental
cruelty for
sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a)
of the
Act. The
position of law in this regard has come to be
well settled and
declared
that levelling disgusting
accusations of unchastity
and indecent
familiarity with a person outside wedlock and allegations
of extramarital
relationship is a
grave assault on
the character, honour,
reputation,
status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions
of perfidiousness
attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of an
educated Indian wife
and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount
to worst form of
insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate
cruelty in law,
warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That
such allegations made
in the written statement or suggested in the course of examination
and by
way of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has
also come to be
firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the relevant
portions of
such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken
to the
findings
recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court.
We find
that they
are of such quality, magnitude and consequence as
to cause mental
pain,
agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated
concept of cruelty
in
matrimonial law causing profound and lasting
disruption and driving
the
wife to feel deeply
hurt and reasonably
apprehend that it
would be
dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting
her like that and
rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible.”
Applying the
said ratio to the facts of this case, we are inclined to
hold that the unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the
Respondent wife
and the threats and attempt to commit suicide by
her amounted to
mental
cruelty and therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved
by a decree of
divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the
Act.
Taking an
overall view of
the entire evidence
and the judgment
delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there
was no
need to
take a different view than the one taken by the trial
Court. The behaviour
of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying and
horrible. One would
find it difficult to live with such a person with
tranquility and peace of
mind. Such torture
would adversely affect the life of the husband. It is
also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the
matrimonial house
on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back. Though not on record, the
learned counsel submitted that till
today, the Respondent
wife is not
staying with the Appellant.
The daughter of the
Appellant and Respondent
has also grown up and according to the learned counsel,
she is
working in
an IT company. We
have no
reason to disbelieve
the aforestated facts
because with the passage of time, the daughter must have
grown up
and the
separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also become
normal for
her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper
to bring them
together, especially when the Appellant husband was
treated so cruelly
by
the Respondent wife.
We, therefore,
quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered by
the High Court. The
decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001
passed by
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore in
M.C. No.603 of
1995 is
hereby restored.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3253 OF 2008
NARENDRA … APPELLANT
VERSUS
K. MEENA … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. This appeal has
been filed by the Appellant husband, whose decree for
divorce passed by the trial
Court has been
set aside by
the impugned
judgment dated 8th March, 2006 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka
at
Bangalore in Miscellaneous First Appeal No.171 of 2002 (FC).
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal,
in a
nutshell, are as
under :
The Respondent
wife filed Miscellaneous First Appeal
under Section
28(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
(hereinafter referred to
as “the
Act”) before the High Court as she was aggrieved by the
judgment and decree
dated 17th November, 2001, passed by the
Principal Judge, Family
Court,
Bangalore in M.C. No.603 of 1995 under Section 13(1)(ia)
of the
Act filed
by the Appellant husband seeking divorce.
3. The Appellant
husband had married
the Respondent wife
on 26th
February, 1992. Out
of the wedlock, a female child named Ranjitha was born
on 13th November, 1993.
The case of the Appellant was that
the Respondent
did not live
happily with the
Appellant even for a month
after the
marriage. The reason
for filing the
divorce petition was
that the
Respondent wife had become cruel because of her
highly suspicious nature
and she used to level absolutely frivolous but serious allegations
against
him regarding his character and more particularly about
his extra-marital
relationship.
Behaviour of the Respondent wife made life of the
Appellant
husband miserable and it became impossible for the
Appellant to stay with
the Respondent
for the aforestated
reasons. Moreover, the
Respondent
wanted the Appellant to leave his parents and other
family members and to
get separated from them so that the Respondent can live independently; and
in that event it would become more torturous for the
Appellant to stay only
with the Respondent wife with her
such nature and
behaviour. The main
ground was cruelty, as serious allegations were levelled
about the moral
character of the Appellant to the effect
that he was
having an extra-
marital affair with a maid, named Kamla. Another important allegation
was
that the Respondent would very often threaten the Appellant
that she
would
commit suicide. In
fact, on 2th July, 1995, she picked up
a quarrel with
the Appellant, went to the bathroom, locked the door from
inside and poured
kerosene on her body and attempted to commit suicide. On getting
smell of
kerosene coming from the bathroom, the Appellant,
his elder brother
and
some of the neighbours broke open the door of the
bathroom and prevented
the Respondent wife from committing suicide. The
aforestated facts were
found to be
sufficient by the
learned Family Court
for granting the
Appellant a decree of divorce dated 17th November,
2001, after considering
the evidence adduced by both the parties.
4. Being aggrieved
by the judgment and decree
of divorce dated
17th
November, 2001, the Respondent wife had filed
Miscellaneous First Appeal
No.171 of 2002 (FC), which has been allowed by the High
Court on 8th March,
2006, whereby the decree of divorce dated 17th November,
2001 has been set
aside. Being
aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High Court,
the Appellant has filed this appeal.
5. The learned
counsel appearing for the Respondent was not present when
the appeal was called out for hearing. The matter was kept
back but for
the whole day, the learned counsel for the Respondent did
not appear. Even
on an earlier occasion on 31st March, 2016, when the appeal
was called out,
the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent wife
was not
present and
therefore, the Court
had heard the
learned counsel appearing
for the
Appellant.
6. The learned
counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted
that the
High Court had committed a grave error in the
process of re-appreciating
the evidence and by setting aside the decree of divorce granted
in favour
of the Appellant. He
submitted that there was no reason to
believe that
there was no cruelty on the part of the Respondent
wife. He highlighted
the observations made by the Family Court and took us
through the evidence,
which was recorded before the Family Court. He drew our
attention to the
depositions made by independent witnesses, neighbours of the
Appellant, who
had rescued the Respondent wife from committing suicide
by breaking open
the door of the bathroom when the Respondent was on the
verge of committing
suicide by pouring kerosene on herself and by lighting a
match stick. Our
attention was also drawn to
the fact that
serious allegations levelled
against the character of the
Appellant in relation
to an extra-marital
affair with a maid were absolutely baseless as no maid named
Kamla had ever
worked in the
house of the
Appellant. It was
also stated that
the
Respondent wife was insisting the
Appellant to get
separated from his
family members and on 12th July, 1995 i.e.
the date of
the attempt to
commit suicide, the
Respondent wife deserted
the Appellant husband.
According to the learned counsel, the facts recorded by
the learned Family
Court after appreciating the evidence were
sufficient to show
that the
Appellant was entitled to a decree of divorce
as per the provisions of
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.
7. We have
carefully gone through the evidence
adduced by the
parties
before the trial Court and we tried to find out as
to why the appellate
Court had taken a different view than the one taken
by the Family
Court
i.e. the trial Court.
8. The High Court
came to the conclusion that there was no cruelty meted
out to the Appellant, which would enable him to get a decree
of divorce, as
per the
provisions of the
Act. The allegations
with regard to the
character of the Appellant and the extra-marital affair with
a maid were
taken very seriously by the Family Court, but the High
Court did not
give
much importance to the false allegations made. The constant
persuasion by
the Respondent
for getting separated
from the family
members of the
Appellant and constraining the Appellant to live separately and
only with
her was also not considered to be of any importance by the
High Court. No
importance was given to the incident with regard to an
attempt to commit
suicide made by the Respondent wife. On the contrary, it appears that
the
High Court found some justification in the request made by
the Respondent
to live separately from the family of the Appellant
husband. According to
the High Court, the trial Court did not appreciate the
evidence properly.
For the aforestated reasons, the High Court reversed the
findings arrived
at by the learned Family Court and set aside the decree of
divorce.
9. We do not agree
with the manner in which
the High Court
has re-
appreciated the evidence and has come to a different conclusion.
10. With regard to
the allegations of cruelty levelled by
the Appellant,
we are in agreement with the findings of the trial Court.
First of all,
let us look at the incident with regard to an attempt to
commit suicide by
the Respondent.
Upon perusal of
the evidence of
the witnesses, the
findings arrived at by the trial Court to the effect
that the Respondent
wife had locked herself in the bathroom and had poured
kerosene on herself
so as to
commit suicide, are
not in dispute.
Fortunately for the
Appellant, because of the noise and disturbance, even the
neighbours of the
Appellant rushed to help and the door of the bathroom
was broken open
and
the Respondent was saved.
Had she been successful in her attempt to commit
suicide, then one can
foresee the consequences
and the plight
of the
Appellant because in that
event the Appellant
would have been
put to
immense difficulties because of the legal provisions. We
feel that there
was no fault on the part of the Appellant nor was there any
reason for the
Respondent wife to make an attempt to commit
suicide. No husband
would
ever be comfortable with or tolerate such an act by his
wife and if the
wife succeeds in committing
suicide, then one
can imagine how
a poor
husband would get entangled into the clutches of law, which
would virtually
ruin his sanity, peace of mind, career and probably his entire
life. The
mere idea with regard to facing legal
consequences would put
a husband
under tremendous stress.
The thought itself is distressing.
Such a mental
cruelty could not have
been taken lightly
by the High
Court. In our
opinion, only this one event was sufficient for the
Appellant husband to
get a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It
is needless to add
that such threats
or acts constitute
cruelty. Our aforesaid
view is
fortified by a decision of this Court in the
case of Pankaj
Mahajan v.
Dimple @ Kajal (2011) 12 SCC
1, wherein it
has been held
that giving
repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty.
11. The Respondent
wife wanted the Appellant to get separated
from his
family. The evidence
shows that the family was virtually maintained
from
the income of the
Appellant husband. It
is not a
common practice or
desirable culture for a Hindu son
in India to get separated
from the
parents upon getting married at the instance of the wife,
especially when
the son is the only earning member in the family. A
son, brought up and
given education by his parents, has a moral and legal
obligation to take
care and maintain the parents, when they become
old and when
they have
either no income or have a meagre income. In
India, generally people
do
not subscribe to
the western thought,
where, upon getting
married or
attaining majority, the son gets separated
from the family.
In normal
circumstances, a wife is expected to be with
the family of the husband
after the marriage.
She becomes integral to and forms part
of the family
of the husband and normally
without any justifiable
strong reason, she
would never insist that her husband should get separated
from the family
and live only with her.
In the instant case,
upon appreciation of the
evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that merely
for monetary
considerations, the Respondent wife wanted to get her
husband separated
from his family. The
averment of the Respondent was to the effect that the
income of the Appellant was also spent for
maintaining his family.
The
said grievance of
the Respondent is
absolutely unjustified. A son
maintaining his parents is absolutely normal in Indian culture
and ethos.
There is no other reason for which the Respondent
wanted the Appellant
to
be separated from the family - the sole reason was to
enjoy the income
of
the Appellant.
Unfortunately, the High Court
considered this to
be a
justifiable reason. In the opinion of
the High Court,
the wife had a
legitimate expectation to see that the income of her husband
is used for
her and not for the family members of the Respondent husband.
We do not
see any reason to justify the said view
of the High
Court. As stated
hereinabove, in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation
of the son to
maintain the parents.
If a wife makes an
attempt to deviate
from the
normal practice and normal
custom of the
society, she must
have some
justifiable
reason for that
and in this
case, we do
not find any
justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the
Respondent wife.
In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this
and no
son would
like to be separated from his old parents and other family
members, who are
also dependent upon his income. The persistent effort
of the Respondent
wife to constrain the Appellant to be separated from the
family would be
torturous for the husband and in our opinion, the
trial Court was
right
when it came to the conclusion that this constitutes an act
of ‘cruelty’.
12. With regard to
the allegations about an
extra-marital affair with
maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of the evidence
by the High
Court
does not appear to be correct. There is sufficient evidence to the
effect
that there was
no maid named
Kamla working at
the residence of the
Appellant. Some
averment with regard to some relative has been relied upon
by the High Court to come to a conclusion that there was a
lady named Kamla
but the High Court has
ignored the fact
that the Respondent
wife had
levelled
allegations with regard
to an extra-marital
affair of the
Appellant with the maid and not with someone else. Even if there
was some
relative named Kamla,
who might have
visited the Appellant,
there is
nothing to substantiate the allegations levelled
by the Respondent
with
regard to an extra-marital affair. True, it is very difficult to establish
such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true
that to suffer an
allegation pertaining to one’s character of having an extra-marital
affair
is quite torturous for any person – be it a husband or
a wife. We
have
carefully gone through the evidence but we
could not find any reliable
evidence to show
that the Appellant
had an extra-marital
affair with
someone. Except for
the baseless and reckless
allegations, there is not
even the slightest evidence that would suggest
that there was
something
like an affair of the Appellant with the maid named by
the Respondent. We
consider levelling of
absolutely false allegations
and that too,
with
regard to an extra-marital life to be quite serious and that
can surely be
a cause for metal cruelty.
13. This Court, in
the case
of Vijaykumar Ramchandra
Bhate v. Neela
Vijaykumar Bhate, 2003 (6) SCC 334 has held as under:-
“7. The question
that requires to be answered first is as to
whether the
averments, accusations and
character assassination of
the wife by the
appellant husband in the written statement constitutes mental
cruelty for
sustaining the claim for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a)
of the
Act. The
position of law in this regard has come to be
well settled and
declared
that levelling disgusting
accusations of unchastity
and indecent
familiarity with a person outside wedlock and allegations
of extramarital
relationship is a
grave assault on
the character, honour,
reputation,
status as well as the health of the wife. Such aspersions
of perfidiousness
attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of an
educated Indian wife
and judged by Indian conditions and standards would amount
to worst form of
insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate
cruelty in law,
warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That
such allegations made
in the written statement or suggested in the course of examination
and by
way of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has
also come to be
firmly laid down by this Court. On going through the relevant
portions of
such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken
to the
findings
recorded by the Family Court as well as the High Court.
We find
that they
are of such quality, magnitude and consequence as
to cause mental
pain,
agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated
concept of cruelty
in
matrimonial law causing profound and lasting
disruption and driving
the
wife to feel deeply
hurt and reasonably
apprehend that it
would be
dangerous for her to live with a husband who was taunting
her like that and
rendered the maintenance of matrimonial home impossible.”
14. Applying the
said ratio to the facts of this case, we are inclined to
hold that the unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the
Respondent wife
and the threats and attempt to commit suicide by
her amounted to
mental
cruelty and therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved
by a decree of
divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the
Act.
15. Taking an
overall view of
the entire evidence
and the judgment
delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that there
was no
need to
take a different view than the one taken by the trial
Court. The behaviour
of the Respondent wife appears to be terrifying and
horrible. One would
find it difficult to live with such a person with
tranquility and peace of
mind. Such torture
would adversely affect the life of the husband. It is
also not in dispute that the Respondent wife had left the
matrimonial house
on 12th July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back. Though not on record, the
learned counsel submitted that till
today, the Respondent
wife is not
staying with the Appellant.
The daughter of the
Appellant and Respondent
has also grown up and according to the learned counsel,
she is
working in
an IT company. We
have no
reason to disbelieve
the aforestated facts
because with the passage of time, the daughter must have
grown up
and the
separation of the Appellant and the wife must have also become
normal for
her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper
to bring them
together, especially when the Appellant husband was
treated so cruelly
by
the Respondent wife.
16. We, therefore,
quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered by
the High Court. The
decree of divorce dated 17th November, 2001
passed by
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore in
M.C. No.603 of
1995 is
hereby restored.
17. The appeal is,
accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.
.…………………………….J.
(ANIL
R. DAVE)
……………………………..J.
(L. NAGESWARA
RAO)
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 06, 2016.
